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Given a semantics σ , two argumentation frameworks (AFs) F and G are said to be standard
equivalent if they possess the same extensions and strongly equivalent if, for any AF H, F
conjoined with H and G conjoined with H are standard equivalent. Argumentation is a
dynamic process and, in general, new arguments occur in response to a former argument
or, more precisely, attack a former argument. For this reason, rather than considering
arbitrary expansions we focus here on expansions where new arguments and attacks may
be added but the attacks among the old arguments remain unchanged. We deﬁne and
characterize two new notions of equivalence between AFs (which lie in-between standard
and strong equivalence), namely normal and strong expansion equivalence. Furthermore,
using the characterization theorems proved in this paper, we draw the connections
between all mentioned notions of equivalence including further equivalence relations, so-
called weak and local expansion equivalence.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In the last two decades argumentation theory has received considerable interest in the AI-community (a basic overview is
given in [1]). Two main directions to handle argumentation formally have been put forward in the literature. First, so-called
abstract argumentation. It is mainly concerned with handling or resolving conﬂicts among arguments without considering
their internal structure. The most known and extensively studied abstract system is the one proposed by Dung in [2].
Dung-style argumentation frameworks (AFs) are simply digraphs treating arguments and attacks as undeﬁned primitives
represented by vertices or edges, respectively. A variety of semantics is provided. Each of them captures different intuitions
about how to reason over conﬂicting knowledge. Reasoning in each case is non-monotonic, that is, new arguments may
attack older ones and thus lead to the rejection of formerly accepted arguments.
The second approach is deductive argumentation (a comprehensive overview can be found in [3]) which is concerned with
constructing arguments from a given knowledge base and furthermore, determining their strength by applying a reasonable
deﬁned notion of attack. The common interaction between both is that deductive AFs instantiate abstract AFs. There are
two mentionable results which show that reasonable deﬁnitions and concepts on the deductive and abstract level may yield
undesired and unintuitive results if they are linked. Besnard and Hunter [4] showed that conveying a deductive defeat-
relation to Dung’s abstract AFs in a straightforward manner may cause a collapse of several semantics. Even worse, Caminada
and Amgoud [5] showed that the outcome of instantiated AFs may fail to satisfy very basic requirements like consistency.
In order to avoid such anomalous results they introduced so-called rationality postulates which should be satisﬁed by any
deductive system. In summary, solution concepts on the abstract level do not necessarily make sense in consideration of
deductive arguments. This means, the study of properties and concepts of argumentation on the abstract level should be
driven by reasonable instantiations.
The work presented in this paper is part of the abstract approach to argumentation. It focuses on new notions of equiva-
lence for abstract argumentation frameworks. In general, equivalence tells us whether two syntactically different knowledge
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base can be replaced by a simpler one. The standard, model based notion of equivalence is appropriate for monotonic log-
ics, yet in the light of potential augmentations stronger notions are necessary for non-monotonic formalisms. Take as an
example logic programs under stable model semantics [6]. The two programs P1 = {a} and P2 = {a ← not b} have the same
stable model, namely {a}. However, if P1 and P2 are later extended with the fact b, then the stable models will no longer
coincide: we obtain {a,b} for the former, {b} for the latter.
This observation led to the investigation of stronger equivalence notions for logic programs, and more recently also for
argumentation. Oikarinen and Woltran [7] introduced the notion of strong equivalence for abstract AFs. Two AFs F and G
are strongly equivalent if for any AF H, F conjoined with H and G conjoined with H possess the same extensions. This
powerful notion of equivalence is the starting point for our research. However, for several typical argumentation scenarios
strong equivalence seems too strong a notion. Just like in the case of other non-monotonic formalisms where further equiv-
alence notions in-between strong and standard equivalence were motivated, deﬁned and studied (see [8] for an excellent
overview) we looked for corresponding notions for AFs which take the very nature of argumentation into account.
What we have in mind can be illustrated with a citation [9]:
How does argumentation usually take place? Argumentation starts when an initial argument is put forward, making
some claim. An objection is raised, in the form of a counterargument. The latter is addressed in turn, eventually giving
rise to a counter-counterargument, if any. And so on.
These speciﬁc kinds of dynamic argumentation scenarios are the focus of our study in this paper. Let us consider a rea-
soning process about defeasible information stored in a knowledge base. What happens on the abstract level if a new piece
of information is added? It turns out that in almost all deductive argumentation systems older arguments and their cor-
responding attacks survive and only new arguments which may interact with the previous ones arise (compare [10]). This
means, in contrast to Oikarinen and Woltran which studied equivalence w.r.t. to arbitrary expansions we are interested in
equivalence relations w.r.t. speciﬁc expansions where the attack relationship between former arguments remains unchanged.
Such kinds of dynamic scenarios correspond with the already deﬁned concepts of normal or strong expansions [11].
Let us consider Dung-style AFs from another point of view – not necessarily connected with the ﬁeld of argumentation
described above. Without doubt, AFs are among the simplest non-monotonic systems one can think of. Yet, this approach is
still powerful. It can be seen as a general theory capturing several non-monotonic formalisms as well as a tool for solving
well-known problems as the stable-marriage problem [2]. The investigation of meta-properties like splitting results [12,13],
replacement theorems [7,14] and intertranslability results [15] has begun quite recently and is still at the beginning. The
logical approach, a methodology introduced by David Pearce [16], represents the view that logical or meta-logical analysis of,
for example, non-monotonic formalisms can be a source of inspiration and may help in the analysis of certain (practical)
problems and the development of the formal framework. In this sense, we believe that our ﬁne-grained analysis of equiv-
alence relations which allow inter-substitutability in certain dynamic contexts will be even fruitful for practical problems
like it was shown in the case of splitting results and its positive inﬂuence on the computational complexity [17].
The main contributions and organization of the paper are as follows. Section 2 reviews the necessary deﬁnitions in ab-
stract argumentation including several argumentation semantics, notions of expansion as well as former splitting results [12]
which will be used as a tool for simplifying proofs. In Section 3, we present several notions of equivalence containing ex-
isting characterization theorems w.r.t. strong equivalence [7]. Furthermore, we draw some preliminary relations between all
introduced equivalence relations. The main results, i.e. characterization theorems for strong and normal expansion equiv-
alence w.r.t. stable, semi-stable, admissible, preferred, ideal, grounded and complete semantics, are then contained in the
following two sections. In particular, quite surprisingly, strong expansion equivalence coincides with strong equivalence in
case of stable and semi-stable semantics. This result does not hold for the other semantics considered in this paper. This
means, in case of admissible, preferred, ideal, grounded and complete semantics strong expansion equivalence is weaker
than strong equivalence. As a further unexpected result we showed that for any considered semantics, two AFs are strongly
equivalent if and only if they are normal expansion equivalent. Section 6 summarizes the results and provides some addi-
tional observations. In particular, we discuss the role of self-loop-free AFs where normal and strong expansion equivalences
collapse to syntactical identity. Furthermore, we use our new characterization results to draw a full picture how the different
equivalence relations are related. Finally, in Section 7 we conclude and discuss related work.
2. Preliminaries
An argumentation framework (AF) is a pair F = (A, R), where A is a non-empty (possibly inﬁnite) set whose elements
are called arguments and R ⊆ A × A a binary relation, called the attack relation. In this paper we restrict ourselves to ﬁnite
AFs. If (a,b) ∈ R holds we say that a attacks b, or b is defeated by a in F . We will slightly abuse notations, and write
(A,b) ∈ R for ∃a ∈ A: (a,b) ∈ R; likewise we use (b, A) ∈ R and (A, A′) ∈ R . An argument a ∈ A is defended by a set A′ ⊆ A
in F if for each b ∈ A with (b,a) ∈ R , (A′,b) ∈ R . Furthermore, we say that a set A′ ⊆ A is conﬂict-free in F if there are
no arguments a,b ∈ A′ such that a attacks b. The set of all conﬂict-free sets of an AF F is denoted by cf (F). For an AF
F = (B, S) we use A(F) to refer to B and R(F) to refer to S . Finally, we introduce the union for two AFs F and G as
F ∪ G = (A(F) ∪ A(G), R(F) ∪ R(G)).
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A semantics σ speciﬁes criteria for determining, given an AF F , sets of arguments where each one of them is considered
to be acceptable w.r.t. F . These sets are called σ -extensions or if clear from context extensions of F . The set of all extensions
is denoted by Eσ (F). One minimal requirement which all existing semantics have in common, is that an extension has to
be conﬂict-free. We consider here the classical Dung semantics, namely, stable, admissible, preferred, complete, grounded
as well as the ideal and semi-stable semantics [2,18,19].
Deﬁnition 1. Let F = (A, R) be an AF and E ⊆ A. E is a
1. stable extension (E ∈ Est(F)) iff
E ∈ cf (F) and for every a ∈ A \ E , (E,a) ∈ R holds,
2. admissible extension1 (E ∈ Ead(F)) iff
E ∈ cf (F) and each a ∈ E is defended by E in A,
3. preferred extension (E ∈ Epr(F)) iff
E ∈ Ead(F) and for each E ′ ∈ Ead(F), E ⊂ E ′ holds,
4. complete extension (E ∈ Eco(F)) iff
E ∈ Ead(F) and for each a ∈ A defended by E in F , a ∈ E holds,
5. grounded extension (E ∈ Egr(F)) iff
E ∈ Eco(F) and for each E ′ ∈ Eco(F), E ′ ⊂ E holds,
6. ideal extension of F (E ∈ Eid(F)) iff
E ∈ Ead(F), E ⊆⋂P∈Epr (F) P and for each A ∈ Ead(F) with the property A ⊆
⋂
P∈Epr (F) P , E ⊂ A holds,
7. semi-stable extension (E ∈ Ess(F)) iff
E ∈ Ead(F) and for each E ′ ∈ Ead(F), R+F (E) ⊂ R+F (E ′) holds, where R+F (E) = E ∪ {b | (a,b) ∈ R,a ∈ E}.
Example 1. Let F = ({a,b, c,d}, {(a,b), (b,a), (b,b), (d,d)}). The graph representation of F is given as follows.
We observe that there are four conﬂict-free sets, namely ∅, {a}, {c} and {a, c}. The following table illustrates whether these
sets are σ -extensions (denoted by ×) or not.
There are several relations between the mentioned semantics, e.g. for any AF F , Est(F) ⊆ Ess(F) ⊆ Epr(F) ⊆ Eco(F) ⊆
Ead(F). The table above shows that stable extensions do not necessarily exist. The semi-stable semantics overcomes this
weaknesses and warrants the existence of extensions in case of ﬁnite AFs and even for subclasses of inﬁnite AFs [20].
However, the other semantics in question are universal, i.e. they always warrant at least one extension. Furthermore, ideal
and grounded semantics follow the unique status approach, i.e. for any AF F , |Egr(F)| = |Eid(F)| = 1. When regarding the
above table we observe that preferred, semi-stable and ideal extensions coincide. It can be shown that this observation
holds in general if the considered AF possesses a unique preferred extension (compare proof of Lemma 2 in [21]). This
property is stated in the following proposition and will be used frequently throughout the paper.
Proposition 1. For any AF F , if |Epr(F)| = 1, then Epr(F) = Ess(F) = Eid(F).
1 Note that it is more common to speak about admissible sets instead of the admissible extensions. For reasons of uniﬁed notation we used the uncom-
mon version.
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As pointed out in the introductory part of this paper we would like to study dynamic notions of equivalence compatible
with the very nature of a dispute where new arguments are put forward in response to former arguments. These kinds of
dynamic scenarios perfectly ﬁt together with the formal concepts of normal and strong expansions ﬁrstly deﬁned in [11].
Deﬁnition 2. An AF F∗ is an expansion of AF F = (A, R) (for short, F ≺F∗) iff F∗ has a representation as (A ∪ A∗, R ∪ R∗),
s.t. at least one of A∗ and R∗ is not empty and A∗ ∩ A = R∗ ∩ R = ∅ holds. Such an expansion is called
1. normal (F ≺N F∗) iff A∗ = ∅ ∧ ∀ab ((a,b) ∈ R∗ → a ∈ A∗ ∨ b ∈ A∗),
2. strong (F ≺NS F∗) iff A≺N A∗ and ∀ab ((a,b) ∈ R∗ → ¬(a ∈ A ∧ b ∈ A∗)),
3. weak (F ≺NW F∗) iff A≺N A∗ and ∀ab ((a,b) ∈ R∗ → ¬(a ∈ A∗ ∧ b ∈ A)),
4. local (F ≺L F∗) iff A∗ = ∅.
For short, normal expansions add new arguments and possibly new attacks. The latter do not contain attacks between
previous arguments. Strong (weak) expansions are normal and only add strong (weak) arguments, i.e. the added arguments
are never attacked by (attack) former arguments. Local expansions do not introduce any new arguments. They only add
further attacks between existing arguments. In consideration of the deﬁnitions we observe that local expansions are the
orthogonal concept to normal expansions or, in other words, any expansions can be split into a normal and local part
(compare AFs G3, G4 and G5 in Example 2).
As usual we use F F∗ to indicate that the equality case is included, i.e. F ≺F∗ ∨F =F∗ holds. The same applies to
the other kinds of expansions. The following ﬁgures exemplify the deﬁnitions.
Example 2. The AF F is the initial framework. Weak and strong expansions of F are given by G1 or G2, respectively.
Furthermore, the AFs G3, G4 and G5 show an arbitrary, normal and local expansion of F .
2.3. Splitting results
Splitting results are concerned with the question whether it is possible to divide a formal theory T in disjoint sub-
theories S1, . . . , Sn such that the formal semantics of the entire theory T can be obtained by constructing the semantics
of S1, . . . , Sn . Such results, especially in non-monotonic formalisms [22–24,12], are of great importance since ﬁrst, they
allow for simpliﬁcation of proofs showing properties of a particular formalism and second, they may yield more eﬃcient
computations. In this paper we will use splitting results for AFs as a tool for simpliﬁcation.
An ongoing task in this paper is the question whether it is possible to ﬁnd an AF H such that, given two AFs F and G ,
the semantics of F ∪H and G ∪H do not coincide. The diﬃculty is that we usually have very limited information about
the AFs F and G .
Example 3. Consider the following AFs F and G . We have A(F) = A(G) = {a,b, c} ∪ B where B is a (possibly empty) set
of further arguments. Furthermore, R(F) = {(a,b), (b,b), (b, c)} ∪ R and R(G) = {(a,b), (b,b)} ∪ S where R and S represent
possible but unknown attacks (indicated by dashed arrows).
Since we have only partial information about the AFs we cannot compute/compare their extensions. For instance, in case
of B = ∅ we deduce Epr(F) = Epr(G) = {{a, c}}, i.e. they possess the same preferred extension. Consider now the AFs F ∪H
and G ∪H where H = (A(F) ∪ {d}, {(d,a)} ∪ {(d,b) | b ∈ B}). Observe that F ∪H and G ∪H are strong expansions of F
or G , respectively.
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known AFs F ∪H and G ∪H in an iterative way. The procedure is as follows: We split the initial AFs into two subframe-
works, namely F1 = G1 = ({d},∅) and F2 = F or G2 = G , respectively (indicated by the dashed lines S1 and S2). We then
take the unique preferred extension {d} of F1 and G1 to reduce the AFs F2 or G2, respectively. In this case, “reducing” quite
simply means deleting all arguments attacked by d. The following AFs F {d}2 and G{d}2 illustrate these reducts.
We now compute the preferred extensions of the reduced AFs, namely Epr(F {d}2 ) = {∅} and Epr(G{d}2 ) = {{c}}. Finally, the
preferred extensions of F ∪H and G ∪H can be obtained by combining {d} and ∅ or {c}, respectively. That means,
{{d}} = Epr(F ∪H) = Epr(G ∪H) = {{c,d}}. In summary, we have shown that the partially known AFs F and G have strong
expansions which possess different preferred and hence, semi-stable and ideal extensions (Proposition 1).
3. Notions of equivalence
It is well-known that logically equivalence in propositional or ﬁrst order logic is even a congruence relation w.r.t. the
logical connectives. This property is the main reason for the validity of the so-called replacement theorem which states that
if two formulae φ1 and φ2 are logically equivalent then no change in the set of models of any formula Φ occurs if we
replace one of them with the other (compare Theorem 4.1 in [25]). For short, possessing the same models guarantees inter-
substitutability in any logical context. Unfortunately, the analogous statement in case of abstract AFs (as well as in other
non-monotonic formalisms) does not hold. Consider the following AFs.
Example 4. The AFs F1 and F2 possess the unique preferred extension {a, c}.
The AF G2 syntactically results by replacing the subframework F1 of G1 with F2. Observe that Epr(G1) = {{a,d}} = {∅} =
Epr(G2).
We now introduce several notions of equivalence between AFs. We will point out some preliminary relations between them
and illustrate their usefulness for certain kinds of dynamics.
3.1. Standard equivalence
The simplest concept of equivalence between two AFs is to have the same extensions. This equivalence relation corre-
sponds to a non-dynamical, static argumentation scenario. All queries w.r.t. credulous or skeptical accepted arguments are
answered identically. In this sense both are mutually replaceable.
Deﬁnition 3. Two AFs F and G are (standard) equivalent to each other w.r.t. a semantics σ , in symbols F ≡σ G , iff Eσ (F) =
Eσ (G) holds.
We recall some relations concerning standard equivalence and different semantics which will be used throughout the
paper. Quite surprisingly, none of the other implications hold as shown in [7].
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1. F ≡ad G ⇒F ≡σ G , σ ∈ {pr, id},
2. F ≡co G ⇒F ≡σ G , σ ∈ {pr, gr, id}.
3.2. Strong equivalence
Standard equivalence of two AFs is not suﬃcient for their mutual replaceability in dynamic argumentation scenarios.
That means, possessing the same extensions does not guarantee to share the same acceptable sets of arguments w.r.t. all
expansions as illustrated in Example 4. Oikarinen and Woltran therefore deﬁned an equivalence relation which enforces this
property, so-called strong equivalence [7].
Deﬁnition 4. Two AFs F and G are strongly equivalent to each other w.r.t. a semantics σ , in symbols F ≡σ G , iff for each
AF H, F ∪H≡σ G ∪H holds.2
Deciding strong equivalence w.r.t. a semantics σ between two AFs F and G can be done by comparing their correspond-
ing σ -kernels Fk(σ ) and Gk(σ ) . A σ -kernel of an AF F is itself an AF obtained from F by deleting certain attacks depending
on the considered semantics σ .
Deﬁnition 5. Given a semantics σ ∈ {st,ad, gr, co} and an AF F = (A, R). We deﬁne the σ -kernel of F as Fk(σ ) = (A, Rk(σ ))
where
1. Rk(st) = R \ {(a,b) | a = b, (a,a) ∈ R},
2. Rk(ad) = R \ {(a,b) | a = b, (a,a) ∈ R, {(b,a), (b,b)} ∩ R = ∅},
3. Rk(gr) = R \ {(a,b) | a = b, (b,b) ∈ R, {(a,a), (b,a)} ∩ R = ∅},
4. Rk(co) = R \ {(a,b) | a = b, (a,a), (b,b) ∈ R}.
We want to mention three simple properties applying to any σ -kernel deﬁned above: First, F and Fk(σ ) share exactly the
same arguments. Second, the attack-relation of Fk(σ ) is contained in the attack-relation of F and third, the kernel operation
is idempotent, i.e. Fk(σ ) = (Fk(σ ))k(σ ) .
Example 5. Consider the AF F and its corresponding stable-kernel Fk(st) and grounded-kernel Fk(gr) .
We list now some non-trivial results showing relations between the syntactical concept of σ -kernels and semantical
deﬁned equivalence relations.3
Lemma 1. For any AF F and σ ∈ {st,ad, gr, co}, F ≡σ Fk(σ ) .
Lemma 2. For any AFs F , G and σ ∈ {st,ad, gr, co} the following holds:
If Fk(σ ) = Gk(σ ) , then (F ∪H)k(σ ) = (G ∪H)k(σ ) for all AFsH.
Theorem 1. For any AFs F , G and σ ∈ {st,ad, gr, co}:
Fk(σ ) = Gk(σ ) ⇔ F ≡σ G.
Theorem 2. For any AFs F and G:
Fk(co) = Gk(co) ⇔ Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) and Fk(gr) = Gk(gr).
Theorem 3. For any AFs F and G the following holds:
F ≡ad G ⇔ F ≡pr G ⇔ F ≡id G ⇔ F ≡ss G.
2 In order to have a uniform notation we slightly differ here from the original version “F ≡σs G”. Deﬁnition 2 justiﬁes the replacement of “s” by “”.
3 The following lemmata and theorems are taken from [7]. Lemma 1 summarizes Lemmata 1, 4, 6 and 10 in [7]. Likewise, Lemma 2 is a summary of
Lemmata 2, 5, 7 and 11. Furthermore, Theorem 1 combines Theorems 1, 2, 3 and 4. Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 correspond directly with Theorem 5 in [7]
or Theorem 2 in [7], respectively.
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same extensions (F ≡st Fk(st) , Lemma 1). Due to the idempotency of st-kernel even the same extensional behavior w.r.t.
arbitrary expansions is guaranteed (F ≡st Fk(st) , Theorem 1). In case of grounded semantics the conditions under which
an attack (a,b) is redundant in the light of dynamics differ, namely: First, a and b are self-attacking or second, if b is
self-defeating and counterattacks a. The latter is the case in Example 5.
3.3. Normal, strong, weak and local expansion equivalence
Now we turn to four intermediate forms of equivalence falling between the aforementioned standard and strong equiva-
lence. We start with their formal deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 6. Given a semantics σ . Two AFs F and G are
1. normal expansion equivalent w.r.t. σ , in symbols F ≡σN G , iff
for each AF H, s.t. F N F ∪H and G N G ∪H, F ∪H≡σ G ∪H holds,
2. strong expansion equivalent w.r.t. σ , in symbols F ≡σNS G , iff
for each AF H, s.t. F NS F ∪H and G NS G ∪H, F ∪H≡σ G ∪H holds,
3. weak expansion equivalent w.r.t. σ , in symbols F ≡σNW G , iff
for each AF H, s.t. F NW F ∪H and G NW G ∪H, F ∪H≡σ G ∪H holds,
4. local expansion equivalent4 w.r.t. σ , in symbols F ≡σL G , iff
for each AF H, s.t. A(H) ⊆ A(F ∪ G), F ∪H≡σ G ∪H holds.
Normal expansion corresponds with dynamic scenarios where it is assumed that – before adding new arguments –
the attack relationships among arguments put forward earlier have been fully clariﬁed and there is no further dispute
concerning these relations. Such kinds of dynamics naturally occur (on the abstract level) if a new piece of information is
added to the knowledge base (deductive level) provided that the underlying notion of argument and attack is maintained.
In consideration of such a (re-)instantiation process normal expansion equivalence allows replacements without loss of
information.
Strong expansion equivalence captures the idea of inter-substitutability in context of only adding stronger arguments.
In consideration of the very nature of a dispute where further arguments occur in response to former arguments this
equivalence relation appears as the most important one. Characterizing weak expansion equivalence seems to be more of
an academic exercise than a task with practical relevance. Being aware of this fact, we emphasize that there are formalisms,
like Value Based AFs [26] where the question of weak expansion equivalence might be relevant. Former arguments may be
arguments which advance higher values than the further arguments. Consequently, the new arguments cannot attack the
former (compare the idea of “attack-succeed” in [26]).
The last intermediate form of equivalence, namely local expansion equivalence was ﬁrstly deﬁned in [7]. The appearance
of new attacks between existing arguments may occur if the underlying attack deﬁnition is changed and the abstract AF has
to re-instantiated. A detailed analysis of attack-relations can be found in [27].
3.4. Preliminary relations
Now we present some preliminary relations between the mentioned notions of equivalence. The presented implications
follow directly from Deﬁnitions 3, 4 and 6. Fig. 1 summarizes all results in a compact way.
Proposition 3. For any AFs F , G , and every (possible) semantics σ the following holds:
1. F ≡σ G ⇒F ≡σN G ⇒F ≡σNS G ⇒F ≡
σ G ,
2. F ≡σ G ⇒F ≡σN G ⇒F ≡σNW G ⇒F ≡
σ G ,
3. F ≡σ G ⇒F ≡σL G ⇒F ≡σ G .
In Subsection 6.3 we will consider again the relations between different notions of equivalence. We will use the results
proven in the following two sections to strengthen the statements in Proposition 3.
4 Oikarinen and Woltran called this locally (strongly) equivalent (compare Deﬁnition 8 in [7]). Note that the deﬁniens of F ≡σL G imply that the consid-
ered AFs H satisfy FH L FH ∪H and GH L FH ∪H where FH = (A(F) ∪ A(H), R(F)) and GH = (A(G) ∪ A(H), R(G)).
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4. Characterizing strong expansion equivalence
In this section we will characterize strong expansion equivalence for stable, semi-stable, admissible, preferred, ideal,
grounded and complete semantics. Analogously to the characterization of strong equivalence we provide syntactical criteria
to decide this notion of equivalence, so-called σ -*-kernels. The main results of this section can be summarized as follows:
• Strong expansion equivalence w.r.t. stable and semi-stable semantics can be decided by the already deﬁned st- and
ad-kernel [7]. This means, in case of these semantics, strong and strong expansion equivalences coincide.
• The concepts of strong expansion equivalence w.r.t. admissible, preferred and ideal semantics coincide and can be
adequately described by the newly introduced ad-*-kernel. Strong equivalence w.r.t. these semantics implies strong
expansion equivalence but not vice versa.
• The characterization of strong expansion equivalence w.r.t. grounded and complete semantics was the most diﬃcult
part. These notions can be decided by the newly introduced gr- or co-*-kernel, respectively. Both concepts are weaker
than there corresponding strong equivalence notions.
4.1. Strong expansion equivalence for stable semantics
Oikarinen and Woltran proved that attacks (a,b) where a is a self-attacking argument do not contribute in the evaluation
of an AF F , no matter how F is extended. Furthermore they showed that the syntactical equivalence of st-kernels, which
“delete” such attacks of a given AF, is necessary and suﬃcient for strong equivalence between two AFs (Theorem 1). Since
the classes of strong and arbitrary expansions are in a proper subset relation we suspected that there are strong expansion
equivalent AFs which are not strongly equivalent. The construction of such an example failed and we tried to prove that
even strong expansion equivalence between two AFs is fulﬁlled if and only if they possess the same st-kernels. The following
theorem proves this conjecture. Remember that the st-kernel of an AF F = (A, R) is Fk(st) = (A, R \ {(a,b) | a = b, (a,a) ∈
R}).
Theorem 4. For any AFs F and G ,
Fk(st) = Gk(st) ⇔ F ≡stNS G.
Proof. We only have to show that F ≡stNS G ⇒F
k(st) = Gk(st) holds since Fk(st) = Gk(st) ⇒F ≡st G ⇒F ≡stN G ⇒F ≡stNS G
is given by Theorem 1 and Proposition 3. We will prove this implication by contraposition.
Suppose Fk(st) = Gk(st) . 1st case: Consider A(Fk(st)) = A(Gk(st)). Consequently A(F) = A(G) and w.l.o.g. there exists an
argument a ∈ A(F) \ A(G). Let c be a new argument, i.e. c /∈ A(F ∪ G) and B = A(F ∪ G) \ {a}. We deﬁne
H= (B ∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ B}).
If a is contained in some E ∈ Est(F ∪H), then E /∈ Est(G ∪H) follows since a /∈ A(G ∪H) was supposed. If not, consider
H′ =H ∪ ({a},∅). Then, E = {a, c} ∈ Est(G ∪H′) and E /∈ Est(F ∪H′) since F ∪H′ = F ∪H holds. By deﬁnition of strong
expansion equivalence F ≡stNS G follows.
2nd case: We now consider A(Fk(st)) = A(Gk(st)) (= A(F) = A(G)) and R(Fk(st)) = R(Gk(st)). W.l.o.g. we may assume the
existence of a,b ∈ A(F), s.t. (a,b) ∈ R(Fk(st)) \ R(Gk(st)). Let c be a fresh argument. We deﬁne
I = (A(F) ∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ A(F) \ {a,b}}).
26 R. Baumann / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 193 (2012) 18–44Case 2.1: Let a = b, therefore (a,a) ∈ R(Fk(st)) \ R(Gk(st)) and consequently (a,a) ∈ R(F) \ R(G) by the deﬁnition
of the stable kernel. Applying splitting results Est(G ∪ I) = {{a, c}} and Est(F ∪ I) = ∅ follow and hence, F ≡stNS G is
shown. Thus from now on we assume that R(Fk(st)) and R(Gk(st)) contain the same self-loops. Case 2.2: Let a = b. Since
(a,b) ∈ R(Fk(st)) \ R(Gk(st)), it follows that (a,b) ∈ R(F), (a,a) /∈ R(F), consequently (a,a) /∈ R(G) and (a,b) /∈ R(G). For
all combinations w.r.t. the presence or absence of (b,a) and (b,b) in F and G we state: First, {a, c} ∈ Est(F ∪ I) since
{a, c} ∈ cf (F ∪ I) and R+F∪I({a, c}) = A(F ∪ I) and second, {a, c} /∈ Est(G ∪ I) since R+G∪I({a, c}) = A(G ∪ I) \ {b}. Hence,
F ≡stNS G follows. 
4.2. Strong expansion equivalence for semi-stable semantics
Semi-stable semantics is, as the name suggests, very close to stable semantics. It can be shown that any stable extension
is semi-stable and furthermore, if there is at least one stable extension then the set of stable and semi-stable extensions
coincide [19]. In spite of these similarities the characterizing kernels of the correspondent strong equivalence notions differ.
Oikarinen and Woltran showed that the equality of the more restrictive ad-kernel of two AFs adequately determines strong
equivalence w.r.t. semi-stable semantics (compare Theorems 1 and 3). Apart from this, the following theorem states a similar
result to Theorem 4, namely that the equality of the ad-kernels of two AFs is even necessarily for their strong expansion
equivalence w.r.t. semi-stable semantics. Remember that the ad-kernel of an AF F = (A, R) is Fk(ad) = (A, R \ {(a,b) | a = b,
(a,a) ∈ R, {(b,a), (b,b) ∩ R = ∅}}).
Theorem 5. For any AFs F and G ,
Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) ⇔ F ≡ssNS G.
Proof. Observe that Theorems 1, 3 and Proposition 3 guarantee Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) ⇒F ≡ssNS G . Hence, it suﬃces to show that
Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) is implied by F ≡ssNS G . We show the contrapositive.
Assume Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) . We have to show F ≡ssNS G which we do by case analysis. In almost all cases (except for the
case 2.2.4) we even prove that, given the assumption, F ≡σNS G for every σ ∈ {ss,ad, pr, id}. This can be shown without
extra effort.5 1st case: Assume A(Fk(ad)) = A(Gk(ad)). Hence, A(F) = A(G) is implied and w.l.o.g. there exists an argument
a ∈ A(F) \ A(G). Let c be a fresh argument, i.e. c /∈ A(F ∪ G) and B = A(F ∪ G) \ {a}. We deﬁne
H= (B ∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ B}).
Given σ ∈ {ss,ad, pr, id}. If a is contained in some E ∈ Eσ (F ∪H), then E /∈ Eσ (G ∪H) follows since a /∈ A(G ∪H)
was supposed. If not, consider H′ = H ∪ ({a},∅). Applying splitting results it follows that E = {a, c} is the unique pre-
ferred extension of G ∪H′ . Consequently, E is admissible in G ∪H′ and the unique semi-stable and ideal extension
of G ∪H′ (Proposition 1). On the other hand, E /∈ Eσ (F ∪H′) since F ∪H′ = F ∪H holds. This means, F ≡σNS G for
σ ∈ {ss,ad, pr, id} is shown since F and G combined with H or H′ are strong expansions of F and G .
2nd case: Consider now R(Fk(ad)) = R(Gk(ad)) and A(Fk(ad)) = A(Gk(ad)). Note that A(F) = A(G) is implied and further-
more, w.l.o.g. we may assume the existence of arguments a,b ∈ A(F), s.t. (a,b) ∈ R(Fk(ad)) \ R(Gk(ad)). Let c be a fresh
argument, i.e. c /∈ A(F). Furthermore we deﬁne
I = (A(F) ∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ A(F) \ {a,b}}).
Case 2.1: Assume a = b. Therefore (a,a) ∈ R(Fk(ad)) \ R(Gk(ad)) and consequently (a,a) ∈ R(F) \ R(G) by deﬁnition of the
admissible kernel. It can be checked (splitting results) that Epr(G ∪ I) = {{a, c}} and Epr(F ∪ I) = {{c}}. Hence, F ∪ I ≡σ
G ∪ I for σ ∈ {ss,ad, pr, id} can be obtained and therefore, F ≡σNS G is shown. Thus from now on we assume that R(F
k(ad)),
R(Gk(ad)), R(F) and R(G) contain the same self-loops.
Case 2.2: Let a = b. Since (a,b) ∈ R(Fk(ad)) \ R(Gk(ad)), it follows (a,b) ∈ R(F). Now we have to distinguish four cases
w.r.t. the presence or absence of the self-loops (a,a) and (b,b). Case 2.2.1: Assume (a,a), (b,b) ∈ R(F). This case is im-
possible because the deﬁnition of the admissible kernel enforce the deletion of (a,b) in R(Fk(ad)). Case 2.2.2: Consider
(a,a) ∈ R(F) and (b,b) /∈ R(F). We observe that (b,a) /∈ R(F) holds (compare admissible kernel). Hence, Epr(F ∪ I) = {{c}}
(splitting results). For G three cases arise. First, (a,b) ∈ R(G) and consequently (b,a) ∈ R(G) because of the assumption
(a,b) /∈ R(Gk(ad)). Second and third, (a,b) /∈ R(G) and (b,a) may or may not be in R(G). Using splitting results it can be
checked that Epr(G ∪ I) = {{b, c}} holds. Thus, F ≡σNS G for σ ∈ {ss,ad, pr, id}. Case 2.2.3: Let (a,a), (b,b) /∈ R(F). We de-
duce (a,b) /∈ G since (a,a) /∈ R(G) and (a,b) /∈ R(Gk(ad)) was assumed. We have to distinguish four sub-cases w.r.t. the
5 We will use these results in Section 5.2 to prove that the admissible kernel adequately describes normal expansion equivalence w.r.t. admissible,
preferred and ideal semantics.
R. Baumann / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 193 (2012) 18–44 27presence or absence of (b,a). Suppose (b,a) /∈ R(F). Hence, Epr(F ∪ I) = {{a, c}}. If (b,a) /∈ R(G), Epr(G ∪ I) = {{a,b, c}}.
If not, Epr(G ∪ I) = {{b, c}}. In both cases Epr(F ∪ I) = Epr(G ∪ I) holds. Consider now (b,a) ∈ R(F). It can be checked
that Epr(F ∪ I) = {{a, c}, {b, c}}. Note that these sets are stable and therefore semi-stable extensions too. Furthermore, {c} is
admissible in F ∪ I and equals {a, c} ∩ {b, c}. This means, Eid(F ∪ I) = {{c}}. Again, if (b,a) /∈ R(G), Epr(G ∪ I) = {{a,b, c}}.
If not, Epr(G ∪ I) = {{b, c}}. Hence, in all cases F ∪ I ≡σ G ∪ I for σ ∈ {ss,ad, pr, id}. Thus, F ≡σNS G for σ ∈ {ss,ad, pr, id}
is shown. Case 2.2.4: Consider (a,a) /∈ R(F) and (b,b) ∈ R(F). As described at the very beginning of the proof this sub-case
is the decisive point where semi-stable and admissible, preferred or ideal semantics behave different. We will only show
that F and G are not strong expansion equivalent w.r.t. semi-stable semantics. In contrast to the other cases the AF I does
not do the trick, i.e. F ∪ I and G ∪ I do not necessarily possess different semi-stable extensions. We therefore introduce a
more sophisticated AF, namely
S = (A(F) ∪ {c,d},{(e, f ) ∣∣ e ∈ {c,d} ∧ f ∈ A(F) \ {a,b}}∪ {(c,d), (d,a), (d, c)}).
The following ﬁgure illustrates F ∪ S and G ∪ S . Note that (a,b) /∈ R(G) is implied since (a,b) /∈ R(Gk(ad)) and (a,a) /∈ R(G)
is assumed. Remember that we already observed that in this case (b,a) may or not be in R(F) or R(G). The dashed arrows
reﬂect this situation. The capital letter B is an abbreviation for the arguments in A(F) \ {a,b}. Furthermore we left out
possible attacks between B and {a,b} since they are not important as we will see.
First notice that Ead(F ∪ S) = Ead(G ∪ S) = {∅, {a, c}, {c}, {d}}. Remember that semi-stable extensions are admissible too.
It turns out that {d} ∈ Ess(G ∪ S) and {d} /∈ Ess(F ∪ S) holds. This can be seen as follows: In both AFs the ranges of {d}
are identical, i.e. R+F∪S ({d}) = R+G∪S ({d}) = A(F ∪ S) \ {b}. Since R+F∪S ({a, c}) = A(F ∪ S) we deduce {d} /∈ Ess(F ∪ S) by
deﬁnition of the semi-stable semantics. On the other hand, for any set E ∈ Ead(G ∪ S), b /∈ R+G∪S (E) because b /∈ E and
(E,b) /∈ R(G ∪ S). Hence, R+G∪S ({d}) ⊂ R+G∪S (E). Consequently, {d} ∈ Ess(G ∪ S) is shown and thus F ≡ssNS G . 
4.3. Strong expansion equivalence for admissible, preferred and ideal semantics
A special feature of strong expansions is that a former attack between old arguments will never become a counterattack
to an added attack. In this sense, former attacks do not play a role w.r.t. being a potential defender of an added argument.
Hence, in contrast to arbitrary expansions where such attacks might be relevant we may delete them without changing the
behavior w.r.t. further evaluations. In the last two subsections we proved that in case of stable and semi-stable semantics
there are no further redundant attacks if we consider strong expansion equivalence. In case of admissible, preferred and
ideal semantics the situation becomes different. Consider the following example.
Example 6. The AFs F and G are not strongly equivalent w.r.t. admissible, preferred and ideal semantics since their corre-
sponding ad-kernels Fk(ad)(=F) and Gk(ad)(= G) are different.
One possible scenario which makes the predicted different behavior explicit is the following where H= ({b, c,d}, {(b,d),
(d, c)}). Observe that {a,d} = Epr(F ∪H) = {∅} = Epr(G ∪H).
Note that the already existing attack (a,b) in F becomes a defending attack of the newly added argument d in the aug-
mented argumentation scenario F ∪H. This means, such attacks in fact play an important role w.r.t. to further evaluation
in case of arbitrary expansions. It is the main result of this section showing that AFs like F and G are strong expansion
equivalent w.r.t. admissible, preferred and ideal semantics. This means, in particular, the attack (a,b) in F is redundant
w.r.t. strong expansions and their evaluations.6
6 We invite and encourage the reader to try to show that this assertion does not hold.
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strong expansion equivalence w.r.t. admissible, preferred and ideal semantics.
Deﬁnition 7. Given an AF F = (A, R). We deﬁne the admissible-*-kernel of F as Fk∗(ad) = (A, Rk∗(ad)) where
Rk
∗(ad) = R \ {(a,b) ∣∣ a = b, ((a,a) ∈ R ∧ {(b,a), (b,b)}∩ R = ∅)∨ ((b,b) ∈ R ∧ ∀c ((b, c) ∈ R
→ {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c), (c,b)} ∩ R = ∅))}.
The newly introduced kernel “forgets” an attack (a,b) if
1. a is self-attacking and at least one of the attacks (b,a) or (b,b) exists or
2. b is self-defeating and furthermore, for all arguments c which are attacked by b at least one of the following conditions
holds: (i) a attacks c, (ii) c attacks a, (iii) c attacks c or (iv) c attacks b.
The ﬁrst condition is exactly the same as in case of the admissible kernel (compare Deﬁnition 5). The motivation for the
second disjunct is the following: At ﬁrst observe that b cannot be an element of any conﬂict-free set. Thus, the attack (a,b)
may only be relevant w.r.t. the defense of c since we are considering strong expansions. In the ﬁrst three cases (i), (ii) and
(iii) this relevance becomes unimportant since {a, c} does not even possess conﬂict-freeness. In case (iv) the redundancy of
(a,b) w.r.t. the defense of c is given by the fact that c already defends itself against b.
In the following we will prove that two AFs F and G possess the same admissible-*-kernel if and only if they are
strong expansion equivalent w.r.t. admissible, preferred and ideal semantics. At ﬁrst we will show that any AF F and its
admissible-*-kernel possess the same extensions w.r.t. the aforementioned semantics.
Lemma 3. For any AF F and σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}, F ≡σ Fk∗(ad) .
Proof. At ﬁrst we show that F and Fk∗(ad) contain the same conﬂict-free sets, i.e. S ∈ cf (F) iff S ∈ cf (Fk∗(ad)). The if-
direction is obvious because R(Fk∗(ad)) ⊆ R(F). It suﬃces to show that if S ∈ cf (Fk∗(ad)), then S ∈ cf (F). Assume not, i.e.
there are at least two arguments a,b ∈ S , s.t. (a,b) ∈ R(F) \ R(Fk∗(ad)). Consequently, (a,a) ∈ R(F) ∨ (b,b) ∈ R(F) has to
hold. This contradicts the conﬂict-freeness of S in Fk∗(ad) because Fk∗(ad) and F share the same self-loops.
We now prove the result for σ = ad. We have to show that for each S conﬂict-free in F and b ∈ S , b is defended
by S in F iff b is defended by S in Fk∗(ad) . Hence, F ≡ad Fk∗(ad) is implied. First, suppose b is defended by S in F ,
i.e. for each (a,b) ∈ R(F), (S, {a}) ∈ R(F). Assume now b is not defended by S in Fk∗(ad) , i.e. it exists (a,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(ad)),
(S, {a}) /∈ R(Fk∗(ad)). That means all counterattacks (c,a) ∈ R(F) have to be deleted. Since S is assumed to be conﬂict-free,
(c, c) /∈ R(F) and hence, (a,a) ∈ R(F) has to hold. If c = b, then (a,b) /∈ R(Fk∗(ad)) because (a,a) ∈ R(F) and (b,a) ∈ R(F)
was assumed. Let c = b. It follows {(b, c), (c,b), (b,b), (b,a)} ∩ R(F) = ∅. The ﬁrst three attacks are impossible because
conﬂict-freeness of S was assumed. Finally, if (b,a) ∈ R(F), (a,b) /∈ R(Fk∗(ad)) follows because (a,a) ∈ R(F) was assumed.
Second, consider b is defended by S in Fk∗(ad) and b is not defended by S in F , i.e. it exists (a,b) ∈ R(F) \ R(Fk∗(ad)),
(S, {a}) /∈ R(F). Since (a,b) /∈ R(Fk∗(ad)), we deduce (a,a) ∈ R(F) and (b,b) /∈ R(F) because conﬂict-freeness of S was as-
sumed. Consequently, (b,a) ∈ R(F) contradicting the assumption that b is not defended by S in F . This concludes the proof
for admissible semantics. Finally, applying Proposition 2, item 1 the claim is veriﬁed for preferred and ideal semantics. 
The following lemma states that, if two AFs F and G possess equal admissible-*-kernels, then the same holds for F ∪H
and G ∪H where the latter AFs are strong expansions of the corresponding former ones.
Lemma 4. If Fk∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) , then (F ∪H)k∗(ad) = (G ∪H)k∗(ad) for all AFsH which satisfy F NS F ∪H and G NS G ∪H.
Proof. First notice that the assumption Fk∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) implies A(F) = A(Fk∗(ad)) = A(Gk∗(ad)) = A(G). Given an AF H,
s.t. F NS F ∪H and G NS G ∪H is satisﬁed. Obviously, (F ∪H)k
∗(ad) and (G ∪H)k∗(ad) share the same arguments. Hence,
it suﬃces to show that R((F ∪H)k∗(ad)) = R((G ∪H)k∗(ad)). Note that F =F ∪H if and only if G = G ∪H. Hence, in case
of equality we have nothing to show because Fk∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) guarantees (F ∪H)k∗(ad) = (G ∪H)k∗(ad) . This means, in the
following we may assume that F ∪H and G ∪H are indeed strong expansions of F or G . Consequently, R(H) ∩ R(F) =
R(H)∩R(G) = ∅ can be assumed (compare Deﬁnition 2). Let (a,b) ∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(ad)). We will show (a,b) ∈ R((G ∪H)k∗(ad))
by proof by cases (containedness of a and b in A(F) or A(H) \ A(F)). Since Fk∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) is assumed, it suﬃces to
consider a = b because the sharing of the same self-loops of (F ∪H)k∗(ad) and (G ∪H)k∗(ad) is implied.
1st case: Let a,b ∈ A(F). If (a,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(ad)), then (a,b) ∈ R(Gk∗(ad)) and (a,b) ∈ R(G) follow. Furthermore (a,b) ∈
R((G ∪H)k∗(ad)) since G NS G ∪H was assumed, i.e. the AF H does not add relevant (w.r.t. the deletion of (a,b)) attacks. As-
suming (a,b) /∈ R(Fk∗(ad)) contradicts (a,b) ∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(ad)) because the reason to remove an attack from F ∪H remains
untouched. 2nd case: Let a,b ∈ A(H) \ A(F). Assume (a,b) /∈ R((G ∪H)k∗(ad)). Hence, several reasons for removing have to
be considered. The ﬁrst possibility is (a,a) ∈ R(H) ∧ {(b,b), (b,a)} ∩ R(H) = ∅ holds. This implies (a,b) /∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(ad)).
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A(G) which is attacked by b we conclude (a,b) /∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(ad)) contradicting the assumption. So, consider c ∈ A(G) and
(b, c) ∈ R(H). Consequently, {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c), (c,b)} ∩ R(G ∪H) = ∅ has to hold. The attacks (c,a) and (c,b) are impossi-
ble since G NS G ∪H was assumed. If (a, c) ∈ R(G ∪H), then (a, c) ∈ R(H) and consequently (a, c) ∈ R(F ∪H) has to hold.
If (c, c) ∈ R(G ∪H), then (c, c) ∈ R(G) and (c, c) ∈ R(F) (since Fk∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) was assumed), therefore (c, c) ∈ R(F ∪H).
In all cases, (a,b) /∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(ad)). 3rd case: Let a ∈ A(H) \ A(F) and b ∈ A(F). Assume (a,b) /∈ R((G ∪H)k∗(ad)). Again,
several reasons for removing have to be considered. First consider (a,a) ∈ R(H) ∧ (b,b) ∈ R(G). We conclude (b,b) ∈ R(F)
because Fk∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) was assumed, thus (a,a), (b,b) ∈ R(F ∪H) holds which contradicts (a,b) ∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(ad)). Note
that (a,a) ∈ R(H)∧ (b,a) ∈ R(G ∪H) is impossible since G NS G ∪H was assumed. Consider now (b,b) ∈ R(G)∧∀c ((b, c) ∈
R(G ∪H) → {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c), (c,b)} ∩ R(G ∪H) = ∅). We observe (b,b) ∈ R(F). Since (a,b) ∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(ad)) was as-
sumed there exists an argument c ∈ A(F), such that (b, c) ∈ R(F) ∧ {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c), (c,b)} ∩ R(F ∪H) = ∅ holds. Thus,
{(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R(G ∪H) = ∅ holds. Remember that we assumed Fk∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) . If (b, c) /∈ R(G), then (b, c) has to
be deleted in R(Fk∗(ad)). But this is impossible since we already concluded (c, c) /∈ R(F) ∧ (c,b) /∈ R(F). If (b, c) ∈ R(G),
then (c,b) ∈ R(G) has to hold since we assumed (a,b) /∈ R((G ∪H)k∗(ad)). Hence, (b, c) has to be deleted in Gk∗(ad)
because (b,b) ∈ R(G) was supposed. This contradicts (b, c) ∈ Fk∗(ad) concluding the proof. 4th case: Let a ∈ A(F) and
b ∈ A(H) \ A(F). Here we have nothing to show because the assumption (a,b) ∈ R(F ∪H) is impossible since F NS F ∪H
was supposed. 
Now we are prepared to show that the syntactical equivalence of admissible-*-kernels characterizes strong expansion
equivalence between two AFs F and G w.r.t. admissible, preferred and ideal semantics.
Theorem 6. For any AFs F , G and σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}:
Fk∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) ⇔ F ≡σNS G.
Proof. Let Fk∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) . Given an AF H, s.t. F NS F ∪H and G NS G ∪H. It suﬃces to show that E ∈ Ead(F ∪H)
implies E ∈ Ead(G ∪H). Suppose E ∈ Ead(F ∪H). By Lemma 3, E ∈ Ead((F ∪H)k∗(ad)) and applying Lemma 4, E ∈
Ead((G ∪H)k∗(ad)). Finally, using Lemma 3, we derive E ∈ Ead(G ∪H) which concludes the if-direction for admissible se-




We now show that Fk∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) implies F ≡σNS G . 1st case: Assume A(F
k∗(ad)) = A(Gk∗(ad)). Hence, w.l.o.g. exists an
argument a ∈ A(F)\ A(G). We deﬁne H= ((A(F)∪ A(G))\ {a},∅). Consider the existence of a set E , s.t. E ∈ Eσ (F ∪H) and
a ∈ E . Consequently, E /∈ Eσ (G ∪H) holds. Assume now that for all extensions E ∈ Eσ (F ∪H), a /∈ E . We deﬁne H′ =H ∪
({a},∅). Hence, F ∪H=F ∪H′ and therefore, for all extensions E ∈ Eσ (F ∪H′), a /∈ E holds. We observe {a} ∈ Ead(G ∪H′)
and furthermore, for each E ∈ Epr(G ∪H′), a ∈ E holds since a is unattacked in G ∪H′ . This implies that a is contained in
the ideal extension of G ∪H′ . In all cases, F ≡σNS G .
2nd case: Consider now R(Fk∗(ad)) = R(Gk∗(ad)) and A(Fk∗(ad)) = A(Gk∗(ad)) (= A(F) = A(G)). Hence, w.l.o.g. there exists
a,b ∈ A(F), s.t. (a,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(ad)) \ R(Gk∗(ad)). Let c be a new argument, i.e. c /∈ A(F). Furthermore we deﬁne
I = (A(F) ∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ A(F) \ {a,b}}).
Case 2.1: Assume a = b. This means (a,a) ∈ R(Fk∗(ad))\ R(Gk∗(ad)) and consequently (a,a) ∈ R(F)\ R(G) by the deﬁnition
of the admissible-*-kernel. It can be checked (splitting results) that {a, c} is an admissible and the unique preferred extension
of G ∪ I . Hence, it follows that {a, c} has to be the unique ideal extension of G ∪ I (Proposition 1). On the other hand, we
have {a, c} /∈ Eσ (F ∪ I) (σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}) since (a,a) ∈ R(F) was assumed. Thus from now on we assume that any self-loop
is either contained in both R(Fk∗(ad)) and R(Gk∗(ad)) or in none of them.
Case 2.2: Let a = b, i.e. (a,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(ad)) \ R(Gk∗(ad)) and (a,b) ∈ R(F). Now we have to distinguish four cases for
the presence or absence of attack (a,a) and (b,b). Keep in mind that R(F), R(G), R(Fk∗(ad)) and R(Gk∗(ad)) contain the
same self-loops. Case 2.2.1: (a,a), (b,b) ∈ R(F). This case is impossible because the deﬁnition of the admissible-*-kernel
enforces the deletion of (a,b) in R(Fk∗(ad)). Case 2.2.2: (a,a), (b,b) /∈ R(F). Note that (a,b) /∈ R(G) holds because a and
b do not exhibit self-loops and (a,b) /∈ R(Gk∗(ad)) was assumed. The attack (b,a) may or may not be an element of R(F)
or R(G). The following results can be checked by using splitting results. If (b,a) /∈ R(F), then {{a, c}} = Eσ (F ∪ I) for
any σ ∈ {pr, id}. If not, i.e. (b,a) ∈ R(F), then {{a, c}, {b, c}} = Epr(F ∪ I) and {{c}} = Eid(F ∪ I). On the other hand, if
(b,a) /∈ R(G), then {{a,b, c}} = Eσ (G ∪ I) holds for any σ ∈ {pr, id}. If not, i.e. (b,a) ∈ R(G) it follows {{b, c}} = Eσ (G ∪ I)
for any σ ∈ {pr, id}. Thus, in all possible combinations we obtain different preferred and ideal extensions. Furthermore,
different admissible extensions are implied (Proposition 2, item 1). This means, we have shown that for any σ ∈ {ad, pr, id},
F ≡σNS G holds. Case 2.2.3: (a,a) ∈ R(F) and (b,b) /∈ R(F). First notice that (b,a) ∈ R(F) cannot hold because (a,a) ∈ R(F)
would enforce the deletion of (a,b) in R(Fk∗(ad)) in contrast to the assumption. Using the standard construction we obtain
{{c}} = Eσ (F ∪ I) for each σ ∈ {pr, id}. In the given self-loop constellation AF G may occur in three conﬁgurations w.r.t.
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and (b,a) ∈ R(G). Note that (a,b) ∈ R(G) and (b,a) /∈ R(G) is impossible since (a,b) /∈ R(Gk∗(ad)) was assumed. In all cases
we obtain {{b, c}} = Eσ (G ∪ I) for each σ ∈ {pr, id}. By Proposition 2 we deduce Ead(F ∪ I) = Ead(G ∪ I). Altogether, we
have shown that F ≡σNS G for each σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}. Case 2.2.4: (a,a) /∈ R(F) and (b,b) ∈ R(F). Since (a,b) ∈ R(F
k∗(ad))
is assumed, we deduce the existence of an argument c ∈ A(F), s.t. (b, c) ∈ R(F) ∧ {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c), (c,b)} ∩ R(F) = ∅
(compare the deﬁnition of the admissible-*-kernel). The following ﬁgures show the remaining two possibilities for AF F .
Note that we omit possible other arguments than a, b and c. This means, the AFs F1 and F2 as well as the subsequent
AFs Gi are only representatives illustrating the relevant parts (consult Section 2.3).
So far we know (a,a), (c, c) /∈ R(G) and (b,b) ∈ R(G). This means there are 26 = 64 possibilities for the presence and
absence of (a,b), (b,a), (b, c), (c,b), (a, c) and (c,a) in R(G). Note that some of them are impossible since (a,b) /∈ R(Gk∗(ad))
was assumed. At ﬁrst we modify the standard construction in the following way (d is a fresh argument):
I ′ = (A(F) ∪ {d},{(d, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ A(F) \ {a,b, c}}).
The following extensions can be checked by applying splitting results (cf. Example 3). It can be easily seen that for each
σ ∈ {pr, id}, Eσ (F1 ∪ I ′) = Eσ (F2 ∪ I ′) = {{a, c,d}} holds. If (a, c) ∈ R(G) or (c,a) ∈ R(G), then for each σ ∈ {ad, pr, id},
{a, c,d} /∈ Eσ (G ∪ H′) holds since {a, c,d} is not conﬂict-free. Hence, w.l.o.g. we may assume (a, c), (c,a) /∈ R(G). Thus,
24 = 16 possibilities w.r.t. the presence or absence of (a,b), (b,a), (b, c) and (c,b) remain. For clarity, we will present all
possibilities.
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G9 and G10 can be checked by considering the union with AF I ′ . For each σ ∈ {pr, id}, {{a,d}} = Eσ (G2 ∪ I ′), {{c,d}} =
Eσ (G9 ∪ I ′) and {{d}} = Eσ (G10 ∪ I ′). For all other cases we deﬁne a slightly different version of I ′ , namely
I ′′ = (A(F) ∪ {d},{(d, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ A(F) \ {b, c}}).
At ﬁrst we have to check the extensions of F1 ∪ I ′′ and F2 ∪ I ′′ . It turns out that for any σ ∈ {pr, id}, {{d}} =
Eσ (F1 ∪ I ′′) = Eσ (F2 ∪ I ′′) holds. On the other hand we have {{c,d}} = Eσ (Gi ∪ I ′′) for each σ ∈ {pr, id} and every
i ∈ {1,3,4,5,7,8,11,12,13,15,16}. Remember that different preferred extensions imply different admissible extensions
(Proposition 2, item 1). This means, ﬁnally, we have shown that for each σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}, F ≡σNS G holds. 
Let us consider again Example 6 from the beginning of this section. According to Theorem 6 we have now formally
proven that F ≡σNS G for σ ∈ {ad, pr, id} since both possess the same admissible-*-kernels, namely F
k∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) = G . In
consideration of Theorem 5 the interested reader may ask for an example showing that F and G are not strong expansion
equivalent w.r.t. semi-stable semantics. Here is a counter-example.
Example 7 (Example 6 cont.). Let F and G as deﬁned in Example 6. We deﬁne H = ({a, c,d, e}, {(d,a), (d, c), (d, e), (e, c),
(e,d)}). The graph representation of F ∪H and G ∪H is as follows.
Observe that both possess the same admissible extensions, namely ∅, {a, e}, {d} and {e}. Furthermore, in case of F ∪H
we have {a, c,d, e} = R+F∪H({d}) ⊂ R+F∪H({a, e}) = {a,b, c,d, e}. Due to the absence of the attack (a,b) in G ∪H it can be
easily seen that {d} is a semi-stable extension in G ∪H. Hence, F ≡ssNS G follows.
4.4. Strong expansion equivalence for grounded semantics
Now we turn to the grounded semantics. Similarly to the case of admissible, preferred and ideal semantics we will see
that strong expansion equivalence between two AFs is not suﬃcient for their strong equivalence w.r.t. grounded semantics.
We therefore introduce a novel kernel, the so-called grounded-*-kernel which is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 8. Given an AF F = (A, R). We deﬁne the grounded-*-kernel of F as Fk∗(gr) = (A, Rk∗(gr)) where
Rk
∗(gr) = R \ {(a,b) ∣∣ a = b, ((b,b) ∈ R ∧ {(a,a), (b,a)}∩ R = ∅)∨ ((b,b) ∈ R ∧ ∀c ((b, c) ∈ R
→ {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R = ∅))}.
The newly introduced kernel “forgets” an attack (a,b) if
1. b is self-attacking and at least one of the attacks (a,a) or (b,a) exists or
2. b is self-defeating and furthermore, for all arguments c which are attacked by b at least one of the following conditions
holds: (i) a attacks c, (ii) c attacks a or (iii) c attacks c.
As explained in Section 4.3 a distinguishing feature of strong expansions in contrast to arbitrary expansions is that an old
argument will never become a defender of a newly introduced and attacked argument. This means, there is more potential
for irrelevant attacks which is reﬂected by the deﬁnition above.
The ﬁrst disjunct captures attacks which are even redundant w.r.t. arbitrary expansions (compare gr-kernel, Deﬁnition 5).
Similar to the deﬁnition of the admissible-*-kernel (Deﬁnition 7) the second disjunct allows the deletions of an attack
(a,b) if b is self-attacking and for all c’s which are attacked by b we have {a, c} is conﬂicting encoded by (i), (ii) and (iii).
In these cases the potential defense of c by a becomes irrelevant since conﬂict-freeness is violated. In contrast to admissible,
preferred and ideal semantics the fourth possibility, namely the presence of the attack (c,b), i.e. c defends itself against b
does not justify a deletion of (a,b). This can be easily seen by considering the original deﬁnition of the grounded semantics
introduced by Dung [2]. The grounded extension of an AF F = (A, R) is alternatively given as the least ﬁx-point of the so-
called characteristic function ΓF : 2A → 2A , where ΓF (S) = {a ∈ A | a is defended by S in F}. In case of ﬁnite AFs, this least
ﬁx-point can be achieved by applying iteratively ΓF on the empty set. Furthermore, ΓF can be shown to be monotonic [2].
This means, the fourth possibility is excluded because the defense of c against b by a may be essential for c being an
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a further kernel deﬁnition since the grounded extensions of an AF F and Fk∗(ad) are not necessarily the same.
Example 8. Observe that Fk∗(ad) = G and Fk∗(gr) =H. Hence, F ≡σNS G for any σ ∈ {ad, pr, id} (Theorem 6). Furthermore,
{∅} = Egr(F) = Egr(G) = {{a, c}} which proves F ≡grNS G . Note that the empty set is also the unique grounded extension
of H. We even claim that F ≡grNS H which will be a consequence of Theorem 7, proved below.
Analogously to the subsection before we will proceed with two technical lemmata paving the way for the main theorem.
Lemma 5. For any AF F , F ≡gr Fk∗(gr) .
Proof. It suﬃces to show that for all i  1, Γ iF (∅) = Γ iFk∗(gr) (∅) holds. We will prove this by induction.
First, we show that the sets of unattacked arguments coincide, i.e. Γ 1F (∅) = Γ 1Fk∗(gr) (∅). Furthermore, Γ 1F (∅) ⊆ Γ 1Fk∗(gr) (∅)
is obvious since R(Fk∗(gr)) ⊆ R(F) holds. Given a ∈ Γ 1Fk∗(gr) (∅), then (a,a) /∈ R(Fk
∗(gr)) and therefore (a,a) /∈ R(F). Assum-
ing that a is attacked in F , i.e. there is an argument b, s.t. (b,a) ∈ R(F) yields to (b,a) ∈ R(Fk∗(gr)) (compare Deﬁnition 8).
This contradicts the assumption that a is unattacked in Fk∗(gr) .
Suppose now that for all i < k, Γ iF (∅) = Γ iFk∗(gr) (∅) holds. We will show that Γ kF (∅) = Γ kFk∗(gr) (∅) is implied. (⊆) Assume
a ∈ Γ kF (∅) and a /∈ Γ kFk∗(gr) (∅). Hence there is an attack (b,a) ∈ R(Fk
∗(gr)), s.t. b is not attacked by Γ k−1Fk∗(gr) (∅) in Fk
∗(gr) .
Since a ∈ Γ kF (∅) was assumed it follows that there is at least one argument c ∈ Γ k−1F (∅) (⊆ Γ kF (∅)), s.t. (c,b) ∈ R(F)
holds (note that b /∈ Γ k−1F (∅) is implied). Consequently, all these attacks have to be deleted in Fk
∗(gr) . We have to consider
several reasons for deletion. First notice that (b,b) ∈ R(F ) (thus (b,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(gr))) has to hold. Furthermore none of the
attacks (a,a), (a, c), (c,a) ∈ R(F) are possible since (a, c) ∈ Γ kF (∅) has to be conﬂict-free. Hence, all arguments c ∈ Γ k−1F (∅)
with the property (c,b) ∈ R(F) have to be counterattacked by b itself, i.e. (b, c) ∈ R(F) (compare kernel-deﬁnition). Note
that all these (b, c)’s survive in R(Fk∗(gr)) because c ∈ Γ k−1F (∅) guarantees (c, c) /∈ R(F). By inductive hypothesis we get
c ∈ Γ k−1Fk∗(gr) (∅) and ﬁnally with (b, c) ∈ R(Fk
∗(gr)) and the observation that all counterattacks to b are deleted we contradict
the admissibility of Γ k−1Fk∗(gr) (∅) in Fk
∗(gr) . (⊇) Given a ∈ Γ kFk∗(gr) (∅), i.e. a is defended by Γ k−1Fk∗(gr) (∅) in Fk
∗(gr) . Furthermore
(a,a) /∈ R(Fk∗(gr)) (thus (a,a) /∈ R(F)) holds since Γ kFk∗(gr) (∅) is conﬂict-free in Fk
∗(gr) . This means, (b,a) ∈ R(Fk∗(gr)) iff
(b,a) ∈ R(F). Hence, using Γ k−1Fk∗(gr) (∅) = Γ k−1F (∅) (inductive hypothesis) and the observation above we deduce that a is
defended by Γ k−1F (∅) in F . Thus, a ∈ Γ kF (∅). 
Lemma 6. If Fk∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr) , then (F ∪H)k∗(gr) = (G ∪H)k∗(gr) for all AFsH which satisfy F NS F ∪H and G NS G ∪H.
Proof. Assume Fk∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr) . Consequently, A(F) = A(Fk∗(gr)) = A(Gk∗(gr)) = A(G) holds. Consider now an AF H sat-
isfying the speciﬁed properties (strong expansion or equality). Note that in case of equality there is nothing to show
since F = F ∪H implies G = G ∪H and vice versa and hence, (F ∪H)k∗(gr) = (G ∪H)k∗(gr) is implied. From now
on we may suppose that F ∪H and G ∪H are indeed strong expansions of F or G . Thus, R(H) ∩ R(F) = ∅ and
R(H) ∩ R(G) = ∅ can be assumed (compare Deﬁnition 2). Let (a,b) ∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(gr)), therefore (a,b) ∈ R(F ∪H). We
will show (a,b) ∈ R((G ∪H)k∗(gr)) by proof by cases (containedness of a and b in A(F) or A(H) \ A(F)). Again we suppose
a = b for all cases (containedness of self-loops is obvious).
1st case: Let a,b ∈ A(F). If (a,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(gr)), then (a,b) ∈ R(Gk∗(gr)) and (a,b) ∈ R(G) follow. Furthermore (a,b) ∈
R((G ∪H)k∗(gr)) is implied because G ∪H was assumed to be a strong expansion of G and so, no relevant attacks
are added. The assumption (a,b) /∈ R(Fk∗(gr)) contradicts (a,b) ∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(gr)) because the reason to remove an at-
tack remains untouched in F ∪H. 2nd case: Let a,b ∈ A(H) \ A(F). Hence, (a,b) ∈ R(G ∪H) is implied. Assume now
(a,b) /∈ R((G ∪H)k∗(gr)). This means, several reasons for removing have to be considered. Observe that (b,b) ∈ R(H) has to
hold. If (a,a) or (b,a) are contained in R(H) we deduce (a,b) /∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(gr)) in contrast to the assumption. Assume now
that ∀c ((b, c) ∈ R(G ∪H) → {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R(G ∪H) = ∅) holds. If there is no c in A(G) which is attacked by b we
conclude (a,b) /∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(gr)). So, consider c ∈ A(G) and (b, c) ∈ R(H). We obtain {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R(G ∪H) = ∅.
The attack (c,a) ∈ R(G ∪H) is impossible since G NS G ∪H was assumed. If (a, c) ∈ R(G ∪H), then (a, c) ∈ R(H) and con-
sequently (a, c) ∈ R(F ∪H) has to hold. If (c, c) ∈ R(G ∪H), then (c, c) ∈ R(G) and (c, c) ∈ R(F) (since Fk∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr)
was assumed), therefore (c, c) ∈ R(F ∪H). In all cases we get (a,b) /∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(gr)) in contrast to the assumption.
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Again, several reasons for removing have to be considered. First, notice that (b,b) ∈ R(G) (thus (b,b) ∈ R(F)) has
to hold. If (a,a) ∈ R(H) holds we deduce (a,a), (b,b) ∈ R(F ∪H) which contradicts (a,b) ∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(gr)). Note
that (b,a) ∈ R(G ∪H) is just impossible since G NS G ∪H was assumed. Assume now that ∀c ((b, c) ∈ R(G ∪H) →
{(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R(G ∪H) = ∅) holds. Since (a,b) ∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(gr)) was assumed there exists an argument c ∈ A(F),
s.t. (b, c) ∈ R(F) ∧ {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R(F ∪H) = ∅. We observe that {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R(G ∪H) = ∅ is implied and
hence, if (b, c) ∈ R(G), then (a,b) ∈ R((G ∪H)k∗(gr)) follows in contrast to the assumption. Remember that Fk∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr)
has to hold. Hence, if (b, c) /∈ R(G), then (b, c) has to be deleted in R(Fk∗(gr)). This is impossible because (c, c) /∈ R(F ∪H)
(thus (c, c) /∈ R(F)) is already shown. 4th case: Let a ∈ A(F) and b ∈ A(H) \ A(F). This case is impossible because
(a,b) ∈ R(F ∪H) cannot hold if F NS F ∪H is fulﬁlled. 
With the help of the two lemmata above we will prove now that syntactical equivalence of grounded-*-kernels of two
AFs characterizes their strong expansion equivalence w.r.t. grounded semantics.
Theorem 7. For any AFs F , G:
Fk∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr) ⇔ F ≡grNS G.
Proof. The if-direction, namely Fk∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr) ⇒F ≡grNS G follows by applying Lemmata 5 and 6 (similarly to Theorem 6).
We will show the only-if-direction by proving the contrapositive, i.e. Fk∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr) ⇒F ≡grNS G .
1st case: Assume A(Fk∗(gr)) = A(Gk∗(gr)). Hence, w.l.o.g. exists an argument a ∈ A(F) \ A(G). We deﬁne H = ((A(F) ∪
A(G)) \ {a},∅). Let E be the unique grounded extension of F ∪H. If a ∈ E , E /∈ Egr(G ∪H) follows. Consider now a /∈ E . We
deﬁne H′ =H∪ ({a},∅). Hence, F ∪H=F ∪H′ and therefore, E is the unique grounded extension of F ∪H′ . Furthermore
we observe that a is unattacked in G ∪H′ and so, a is contained in the unique grounded extension E ′ of G ∪H′ . Hence,
F ≡grNS G follows.
2nd case: Consider R(Fk∗(gr)) = R(Gk∗(gr)) and A(Fk∗(gr)) = A(Gk∗(gr)) (= A(F) = A(G)). Hence, w.l.o.g. there exists
a,b ∈ A(F), s.t. (a,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(gr)) \ R(Gk∗(gr)). Let c be a new argument, i.e. c /∈ A(F). Furthermore we deﬁne
I = (A(F) ∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ A(F) \ {a,b}}).
Case 2.1: Let a = b. This means (a,a) ∈ R(Fk∗(gr)) \ R(Gk∗(gr)) and consequently (a,a) ∈ R(F) \ R(G) by the deﬁnition of
the grounded-*-kernel. It is easy to see (splitting results) that {{c}} = Egr(F ∪ I) = Egr(G ∪ I) = {{a, c}} holds. From now on
we suppose that any self-loop is either contained in both R(Fk∗(gr)) and R(Gk∗(gr)) or in none of them.
Case 2.2: Consider now a = b, i.e. (a,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(gr)) \ R(Gk∗(gr)) and (a,b) ∈ R(F). We have to distinguish four cases for
the presence or absence of attack (a,a) and (b,b). Keep in mind that R(F), R(G), R(Fk∗(gr)) and R(Gk∗(gr)) contain the same
self-loops. Case 2.2.1: (a,a), (b,b) ∈ R(F). This case is impossible because (a,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(gr)) cannot hold (grounded-*-kernel,
Deﬁnition 8). Case 2.2.2: (a,a), (b,b) /∈ R(F). Note that (a,b) /∈ R(G) holds because (b,b) /∈ R(G) and (a,b) /∈ R(Gk∗(gr)) was
assumed. The attack (b,a) may or may not be an element of R(F) or R(G). If (b,a) /∈ R(F), {{a, c}} = Egr(F ∪ I) follows.
If not, i.e. (b,a) ∈ R(F), then {{c}} = Egr(F ∪ I) holds. Furthermore, if (b,a) /∈ R(G) we deduce {{a,b, c}} = Egr(G ∪ I) and
if not, i.e. (b,a) ∈ R(G) it follows {{b, c}} = Egr(G ∪ I). Thus, in all possible combinations we obtain different grounded
extensions, i.e. F ≡grNS G . Case 2.2.3: (a,a) ∈ R(F) and (b,b) /∈ R(F). Again, it is impossible that (a,b) ∈ R(G) holds since
(b,b) /∈ R(G) and (a,b) /∈ R(Gk∗(gr)) was assumed. The attack (b,a) may or may not be an element of R(F) and R(G). Either
way, {{c}} = Egr(F ∪ I) = Egr(G ∪ I) = {{b, c}} follows. Hence, F ≡grNS G . Case 2.2.4: (a,a) /∈ R(F) and (b,b) ∈ R(F). Since
(a,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(gr)) is assumed, we deduce (b,a) /∈ R(F) and furthermore the existence of an argument c ∈ A(F): (b, c) ∈
R(F) ∧ {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R(F) = ∅ (compare Deﬁnition 8). The following ﬁgures show the remaining two possibilities
for AF F . Note that we omit possible other arguments than a, b and c.
Up to now we know (a,a), (c, c) /∈ R(G) and (b,b) ∈ R(G). Hence, there are 26 = 64 possibilities for the presence and
absence of (a,b), (b,a), (b, c), (c,b), (a, c) and (c,a) in R(G). We will show that some of them are impossible since (a,b) /∈
R(Gk∗(gr)) was assumed. Again, we use the slightly different version of the standard construction I , namely
I ′ = (A(F) ∪ {d},{(d, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ A(F) \ {a,b, c}}).
It can be checked that Egr(F1 ∪ I ′) = Egr(F2 ∪ I ′) = {{a, c,d}}. If (a, c) ∈ R(G) or (c,a) ∈ R(G), then {{a, c,d}} =
Egr(G ∪ I ′) because a grounded extension has to be conﬂict-free. From now on we assume (a, c), (c,a) /∈ R(G). This
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ing possibilities are listed in Theorem 6 (see p. 30). G6 (= F2) and G8 (= F1) are impossible since (a,b) /∈ R(Gk∗(gr)) was
assumed. The cases G2, G4, G9, G10, G12, G13, G14 and G16 can be checked by considering the union with AF I ′ . For every
i ∈ {2,4,9,10,12,13,14,16}, {{a, c,d}} = Egr(Gi ∪ I ′) holds. For all other cases we use
I ′′ = (A(F) ∪ {d},{(d, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ A(F) \ {b, c}}).
Combining F1 and F2 with I ′′ we get {{d}} = Egr(F1 ∪ I ′′) = Egr(F2 ∪ I ′′). Furthermore we have {{c,d}} = Egr(Gi ∪ I ′′)
for every i ∈ {1,3,5,7,11,15}. Hence, F ≡grNS G concluding the proof. 
Finally, we will give a counter-example showing that strong expansion equivalence is not suﬃcient for strong equivalence
w.r.t. grounded semantics as stated at the very beginning of this section.
Example 9. The AFs F and G are strong expansion equivalent since they possess equal grounded-*-kernels, namely Fk∗(gr) =
Gk∗(gr) = G (Theorem 7).
Furthermore, they are not strongly equivalent w.r.t. grounded semantics which can be demonstrated by the following
expansions F ∪H of F and G ∪H of G , where H= ({b,d}, {(b,d)}).
Using Dung’s characteristic function we identify different grounded extensions for F ∪H and G ∪H, namely {a,d}
resp. {a}.
4.5. Strong expansion equivalence for complete semantics
Finally, we consider the last novel kernel deﬁnition, the so-called complete-*-kernel which characterizes strong expansion
equivalence w.r.t. complete semantics. Here is the formal deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 9. Given an AF F = (A, R). We deﬁne the complete-*-kernel of F as Fk∗(co) = (A, Rk∗(co)) where
Rk
∗(co) = R \ {(a,b) ∣∣ a = b, ((a,a), (b,b) ∈ R)∨ ((b,b) ∈ R ∧ (b,a) /∈ R ∧ ∀c ((b, c) ∈ R
→ {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R = ∅))}.
The newly introduced kernel “forgets” an attack (a,b) if
1. a and b are self-attacking or
2. b is self-defeating, b does not attack a and furthermore, for all arguments c which are attacked by b at least one of the
following conditions holds: (i) a attacks c, (ii) c attacks a or (iii) c attacks c.
The ﬁrst disjunct describes attacks which are even redundant w.r.t. arbitrary expansions (compare gr-kernel, Deﬁnition 5).
The additional part (second disjunct) of the complete-*-kernel is very similar to the grounded-*-kernel (Deﬁnition 8). The
difference is that the deletion of an attack (a,b) requires the additional precondition that b does not attack a. This is due to
the fact that the attack (a,b) may be crucial for the acceptance of the argument a if (b,a) is established. Roughly speaking,
the argument a may justify its acceptance itself in contrast to grounded semantics where the reason for being a member
of the unique grounded extension has to come from the outside, i.e. former accepted arguments have to defend a. Consider
the following example.
Example 10. The AFs F and G (= Fk∗(gr)) are strong expansion equivalent w.r.t. grounded semantics (Theorem 7). In par-
ticular, the deletion of (a,b) is irrelevant w.r.t. the grounded extensions of F and G . Observe that in the case of complete
semantics (a,b) is essential since {a} is no longer complete in G .
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its complete-*-kernel possess the same complete extensions.
Lemma 7. For any AF F , F ≡co Fk∗(co) .
Proof. The ﬁrst step is to show that F and Fk∗(co) contain the same conﬂict-free sets, i.e. S ∈ cf (F) iff S ∈ cf (Fk∗(co)). The
if-direction is obvious because R(Fk∗(co)) ⊆ R(F) holds (complete-*-kernel). Assume now S ∈ cf (Fk∗(co)) and S /∈ cf (F).
Consequently, there are two arguments a and b in S with the property (a,b) ∈ R(F) \ R(Fk∗(co)). In any case, (b,b) ∈ R(F)
has to hold. The same applies to R(Fk∗(co)) which contradicts the assumption S ∈ cf (Fk∗(ad)).
We now prove that E ∈ Eco(F) implies E ∈ Eco(Fk∗(co)). At ﬁrst we will show that E is admissible in Fk∗(co) . Assume
E ∈ Eco(F) and E do not defend all its elements in Fk∗(co) . This means, there is an argument a ∈ E and an argument b /∈ E
(conﬂict-freeness) s.t. (b,a) ∈ R(Fk∗(co)) and (E,b) /∈ R(Fk∗(co)). Since R(Fk∗(co)) ⊆ R(F) and Eco(F) ⊆ Ead(F) hold, we
deduce the existence of an argument c ∈ E , s.t. (c,b) ∈ R(F)\ R(Fk∗(co)). There are two possibilities for the deletion of (c,b)
in R(Fk∗(co)). First, (c, c), (b,b) ∈ R(F) and second, (b,b) ∈ R(F), (b, c) /∈ R(F) and at least {(a, c), (c,a), (a,a)} ∩ R(F) = ∅.
Due to the conﬂict-freeness of E in F and the membership of a and c in E both options fail. Assume now E ∈ Eco(F)
but E does not contain all defended elements in Fk∗(co) . Hence, there is an argument a /∈ E , s.t. for all arguments c with
(c,a) ∈ R(Fk∗(co)), (E, c) ∈ R(Fk∗(co)). Since E is assumed to be complete in F and a /∈ E we deduce the existence of an
argument c with the property (c,a) ∈ R(F) and (E, c) /∈ R(F). Combining both conclusions we get (c,a) ∈ R(F)\ R(Fk∗(co)).
In any case, (a,a) ∈ R(F) and thus, (a,a) ∈ R(Fk∗(co)). Since a is defended by E in Fk∗(co) , (E,a) ∈ R(Fk∗(co)) has to hold.
Finally, (E, E) ∈ R(Fk∗(co)) follows contradicting the conﬂict-freeness of E in Fk∗(co) .
We now prove that E ∈ Eco(Fk∗(co)) implies E ∈ Eco(F). First of all, we show the admissibility of E in F . Given E ∈
Eco(Fk∗(co)), we assume the existence of an argument a ∈ E and an argument b /∈ E (conﬂict-freeness), s.t. (b,a) ∈ R(F)
and (E,b) /∈ R(F) holds. Due to the relations R(Fk∗(co)) ⊆ R(F) and Eco(Fk∗(co)) ⊆ Ead(Fk∗(co)), (b,a) ∈ R(F) \ R(Fk∗(co))
follows. Consequently, (a,a) ∈ R(F) has to hold contradicting the conﬂict-freeness of E in F . Assume now that E do
not contain all defended elements in F , i.e. there exists an argument a /∈ E , s.t. for all arguments c with the property
(c,a) ∈ R(F), (E, c) ∈ R(F) holds. Since E is assumed to be complete in Fk∗(co) and a /∈ E holds, we deduce the existence
of an argument c, s.t. (c,a) ∈ R(Fk∗(co)) and (E, c) /∈ R(Fk∗(co)). Altogether, (c,a) ∈ R(Fk∗(co)) and (E, c) ∈ R(F) \ R(Fk∗(co)).
Let d be the argument in E which attacks c, i.e. (d, c) ∈ R(F) \ R(Fk∗(co)). We observe that (d,d) ∈ R(F) is impossible
because E ∈ cf (F) is assumed. Hence, (c, c) ∈ R(F), (c,d) /∈ R(F) and {(a,a), (a,d), (d,a)} ∩ R(F) = ∅ follows. The cases
(a,a) ∈ R(F) and (d,a) ∈ R(F) contradict the conﬂict-freeness of E in F because a is assumed to be defended by E
in F . In case of (a,d) ∈ R(F) we use the already shown admissibility of E in F to infer (E,a) ∈ R(F). Again, we get
a contradiction to the conﬂict-freeness of E in F if we apply that a is defended by E in F . 
The next lemma proves the robustness of the complete-*-kernel. That means, if two AFs F and G possess the same
complete-*-kernel, then the same applies for any compositions F ∪H and G ∪H under the condition that the latter are
strong expansions of there initial frameworks F and G , respectively.
Lemma 8. If Fk∗(co) = Gk∗(co) , then (F ∪H)k∗(co) = (G ∪H)k∗(co) for all AFsH which satisfy F NS F ∪H and G NS G ∪H.
Proof. First notice that the assumption Fk∗(co) = Gk∗(co) implies A(F) = A(Fk∗(co)) = A(Gk∗(co)) = A(G). Consider now an
AF H satisfying the speciﬁed properties (strong expansion or equality). If F =F ∪H, then G = G ∪H is implied (and vice
versa). Consequently, in this case it is nothing to show because (F ∪H)k∗(co) = (G ∪H)k∗(co) follows immediately. W.l.o.g. we
may assume that F ∪H and G ∪H are indeed strong expansions of F or G . Thus, R(H) ∩ R(F) = ∅ and R(H) ∩ R(G) = ∅
can be assumed. Let (a,b) ∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(co)), therefore (a,b) ∈ R(F ∪H). We will show (a,b) ∈ R((G ∪H)k∗(co)) by proof
by cases (containedness of a and b in A(F) or A(H) \ A(F)). For all cases we will suppose a = b since the self-loop case is
obvious.
1st case: Let a,b ∈ A(F). Assuming (a,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(co)) implies (a,b) ∈ R(Gk∗(co)) and therefore (a,b) ∈ R(G). Conse-
quently (a,b) ∈ R((G ∪H)k∗(co)) holds since G ∪H was assumed to be a strong expansion of G and so, no relevant attacks
are added. The assumption (a,b) /∈ R(Fk∗(co)) contradicts (a,b) ∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(co)) because the reason to remove an attack
remains untouched in F ∪H. 2nd case: Let a,b ∈ A(H) \ A(F). Thus, (a,b) ∈ R(G ∪H) is implied. Suppose now (a,b) /∈
R((G ∪H)k∗(co)). This means, several reasons for removing have to be checked. The assumption (a,a), (b,b) ∈ R(H) is incon-
sistent with (a,b) ∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(co)). Thus, (b,b) ∈ R(H), (b,a) /∈ R(H) and ∀c ((b, c) ∈ R(G ∪H) → {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩
R(G ∪H) = ∅) has to hold. If there is no c in A(G) which is attacked by b we deduce (a,b) /∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(gr)). Thus,
consider an argument c ∈ A(G) with the property (b, c) ∈ R(H). Hence, {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R(G ∪H) = ∅ has to hold.
In the ﬁrst case, namely (a, c) ∈ R(G ∪H), (a, c) ∈ R(H) and consequently (a, c) ∈ R(F ∪H) follows. The second case,
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then (c, c) ∈ R(G) and (c, c) ∈ R(F) (since Fk∗(co) = Gk∗(co) was assumed), therefore (c, c) ∈ R(F ∪H). In all cases we de-
duce (a,b) /∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(co)) contradicting the assumption. 3rd case: Let a ∈ A(H) \ A(F) and b ∈ A(F). Consequently,
(a,b) ∈ R(G ∪H) holds. Assume now (a,b) /∈ R((G ∪H)k∗(co)). Again, several reasons for removing have to be considered.
We observe that (b,b) ∈ R(G) (thus (b,b) ∈ R(F)) has to hold. If (a,a) ∈ R(H) holds we deduce (a,a), (b,b) ∈ R(F ∪H)
contrary to (a,b) ∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(co)). Furthermore, we observe (b,a) /∈ R(F ∪H), R(G ∪H) because F ∪H and G ∪H are
assumed to be strong expansions of F and G respectively. Together with the assumption (a,b) ∈ R((F ∪H)k∗(co)) we de-
duce the existence of an argument c ∈ A(F), s.t. (b, c) ∈ R(F) ∧ {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R(F ∪H) = ∅. Hence, (c, c) /∈ R(F)
(therefore (c, c) /∈ R(G)) and (a, c), (c,a) /∈ R(H) is implied. Consequently, if (b, c) ∈ R(G), then (a,b) ∈ R((G ∪H)k∗(co)) con-
tradicting the assumption. Remember that Fk∗(co) = Gk∗(co) has to hold. Hence, if (b, c) /∈ R(G), then (b, c) has to be deleted
in R(Fk∗(co)). This is impossible because (c, c) /∈ R(F) is already shown. 4th case: Let a ∈ A(F) and b ∈ A(H) \ A(F). Here
is nothing to show because (a,b) ∈ R(F ∪H) cannot hold if F NS F ∪H is fulﬁlled. 
Now we are prepared to show the main theorem for the case of complete semantics. The notion of complete-*-kernel is
suitable to describe strong expansions equivalence w.r.t. complete semantics.
Theorem 8. For any AFs F , G:
Fk∗(co) = Gk∗(co) ⇔ F ≡coNS G.
Proof. The ﬁrst direction, namely Fk∗(co) = Gk∗(co) ⇒ F ≡coNS G can be shown by applying Lemmata 7 and 8 (similarly to
Theorem 7). We will prove the only-if-direction by showing the contrapositive, i.e. Fk∗(co) = Gk∗(co) ⇒F ≡coNS G .
1st case: Suppose A(Fk∗(co)) = A(Gk∗(co)). Thus, w.l.o.g. exists an argument a ∈ A(F) \ A(G). We deﬁne H = ((A(F) ∪
A(G)) \ {a},∅). Consider the existence of an extension E ∈ Eco(F ∪H), s.t. a ∈ E holds. Consequently, E /∈ Eco(G ∪H) and
therefore F ≡coNS G . Hence, we may assume that for all extensions E ∈ Eco(F ∪H), a /∈ E holds. We deﬁne H
′ =H∪ ({a},∅).
Observe that a is unattacked in H′ . Since G ∪H′ = H′ we deduce that for any extension E ∈ Eco(G ∪H′), a ∈ E holds.
Remember that the existence of a complete extension is guaranteed. Finally, since Eco(F ∪H) = Eco(F ∪H′) obviously
holds we are done.
2nd case: Assume R(Fk∗(co)) = R(Gk∗(co)) and A(Fk∗(co)) = A(Gk∗(co)) (= A(F) = A(G)). Thus, w.l.o.g. there exist some
arguments a,b ∈ A(F) with the property (a,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(co))\R(Gk∗(co)). Let c be a fresh argument, i.e. c /∈ A(F). Furthermore
we deﬁne
I = (A(F) ∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ A(F) \ {a,b}}).
Case 2.1: Let a = b (self-loop case). Hence, (a,a) ∈ R(Fk∗(co)) \ R(Gk∗(co)) and therefore (a,a) ∈ R(F) \ R(G) follows. We
obtain {{c}} = Egr(F ∪ I) = Egr(G ∪ I) = {{a, c}}. From now on we suppose that any self-loop is either contained in both
R(Fk∗(co)) and R(Gk∗(co)) or in none of them.
Case 2.2: Assume a = b. This means, (a,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(co)) \ R(Gk∗(co)) and (a,b) ∈ R(F). We will distinguish four cases for
the presence or absence of the self-loops (a,a) and (b,b). Remember that R(F), R(G), R(Fk∗(co)) and R(Gk∗(co)) contain the
same self-loops. Case 2.2.1: (a,a), (b,b) ∈ R(F). This case contradicts the assumption because (a,b) ∈ R(Fk∗(co)) cannot be
fulﬁlled (compare complete-*-kernel). Case 2.2.2: (a,a), (b,b) /∈ R(F). Observe that (a,b) /∈ R(G) holds because (b,b) /∈ R(G)
and (a,b) /∈ R(Gk∗(co)) was assumed. The attack (b,a) may or may not be an element of R(F) or R(G). In any case, {a, c} ∈
Eco(F ∪ I). This can be checked by applying splitting results. In the following we will leave this comment out. If (b,a) /∈
R(G), then {{a,b, c}} = Eco(G ∪ I) follows and if not, we deduce {{b, c}} = Eco(G ∪ I). Thus, F ≡coNS G is shown. Case 2.2.3:
(a,a) ∈ R(F) and (b,b) /∈ R(F). Again, it is impossible that (a,b) ∈ R(G) holds since (b,b) /∈ R(G) and (a,b) /∈ R(Gk∗(co)) was
assumed. The attack (b,a) may be contained in R(F), R(G) or not. In any case, {c} ∈ Eco(F ∪ I) and Eco(G ∪ I) = {{b, c}}
holds. Hence, F ≡coNS G . Case 2.2.4: (a,a) /∈ R(F) and (b,b) ∈ R(F). Since (a,b) ∈ R(F
k∗(gr)) is assumed, we have to consider
two sub-cases: First, (b,a) ∈ R(F) and second, (b,a) /∈ R(F) ∧ ∃c ∈ A(F): (b, c) ∈ R(F) ∧ {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R(F) = ∅
(compare complete-*-kernel). If (b,a) ∈ R(F), then {{c}, {c,a}} = Eco(F ∪ I) follows. Since (a,b) /∈ Gk∗(co) is assumed, we
deduce that if (a,b) ∈ R(G), then (b,a) /∈ R(G) has to hold. In this case we obtain {{c,a}} = Eco(G ∪ I). Let (a,b) /∈ R(G).
Hence, (b,a) may or may not be an element of R(G). If (b,a) is contained in R(G), {{c}} = Eco(G ∪ I) and if not, {{a, c}} =
Eco(G ∪ I). Altogether, we have shown that in the ﬁrst sub-case F ≡coNS G is implied. Consider now (b,a) /∈ R(F) ∧ ∃c ∈
A(F): (b, c) ∈ R(F) ∧ {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R(F) = ∅. Just like in case of grounded semantics, two possibilities for AF F
remain. Again, we omit possible other arguments than a, b, and c.
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absence of (a,b), (b,a), (b, c), (c,b), (a, c) and (c,a) in R(G). Let d be a fresh argument. We deﬁne
I ′ = (A(F) ∪ {d},{(d, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ A(F) \ {a,b, c}}).
Observe that Eco(F1 ∪ I ′) = Eco(F2 ∪ I ′) = {{a, c,d}} holds. If (a, c) ∈ R(G) or (c,a) ∈ R(G), then {a, c,d} /∈ Eco(G ∪ I ′)
because complete extensions are conﬂict-free. Hence, we may assume (a, c), (c,a) /∈ R(G). This means, 24 = 16 possibilities
w.r.t. the presence or absence of (a,b), (b,a), (b, c) and (c,b) remain. These sixteen AFs are listed in Theorem 6 (see p. 30).
G6 (= F2) and G8 (= F1) as well as G13, G14, G15 and G16 are impossible because (a,b) /∈ R(Gk∗(co)) was assumed. Now,
we notice by comparing to the proof of Theorem 8 that the remaining possibilities and F1 respectively F2 are not strong
expansion equivalent w.r.t. the grounded semantics. Hence, by Proposition 2, item 2, F ≡coNS G . 
We ﬁnish this section by giving an example showing that strong expansion equivalence and strong equivalence w.r.t. com-
plete semantics do not coincide.
Example 11. On the one hand, the AFs F and G are strong expansion equivalent w.r.t. complete semantics because Fk∗(co) =
Gk∗(co) = G (Theorem 8). On the other hand, they are not equivalent w.r.t. arbitrary expansions which can be made explicit
by conjoining them with H= ({a,b}, {(b,a)}). We have {a} ∈ Eco(F ∪H) and {a} /∈ Eco(G ∪H).
5. Characterizing normal expansion equivalence
The main aim of this section is the characterization of normal expansion equivalence w.r.t. stable, semi-stable, admissible,
preferred, ideal, grounded and complete semantics. We will see that there is no need for further novel kernel deﬁnitions.
In fact, the main and quite surprisingly result for the considered semantics can be brieﬂy and concisely presented in the
following “equality”:
normal expansion equivalence = strong equivalence.
This means, if two AFs F and G are proven to be normal expansion equivalent, then the requirement that F and G
are equivalent when conjoined with any further framework H is fulﬁlled too. This is quite surprising since the class of
normal expansions is obviously a proper subset of the class of arbitrary expansions. In other words, if different implicit
information of two AFs F and G is made explicit by conjoining them with an AF H which adds further attacks between
former arguments, then there exists an AF H′ showing this difference without changing the former attack-relations of F
and G . Consider the following example.
Example 12 (Example 11 cont.). In Example 11 we observed that F and G are not strongly equivalent w.r.t. complete seman-
tics. This property can be shown by conjoining them with H′ = ({a,b, c,d}, {(b,d), (c,a), (d, c)}) which do not add further
attacks between the old arguments a and b. Note that {a,d} ∈ Eco(F ∪H′) and {a,d} /∈ Eco(G ∪H′).
5.1. Normal expansion equivalence for stable semantics
At ﬁrst we consider stable semantics. Remember that we have already shown (Section 4.1) that the notion of st-kernel
not only characterizes strong equivalence but also strong expansion equivalence w.r.t. stable semantics. In consideration
that the class of normal expansions lie in-between (w.r.t. subset-relation) the classes of arbitrary and strong expansions the
following theorems follow immediately.
Theorem 9. For any AFs F , G ,
Fk(st) = Gk(st) ⇔ F ≡stN G.
Proof. Combine Theorems 1, 4 and Proposition 3. 
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Oikarinen and Woltran showed that the ad-kernel serves as a uniform characterization for strong equivalence w.r.t. semi-
stable, admissible, preferred and ideal semantics (Theorems 1, 3). The following theorem proves that this result carries over
to normal expansion equivalence. Remember that the ad-kernel of an AF F = (A, R) is Fk(ad) = (A, R \ {(a,b) | a = b, (a,a) ∈
R, {(b,a), (b,b) ∩ R = ∅}}).
Theorem 10. For any AFs F , G and σ ∈ {ss,ad, pr, id},
Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) ⇔ F ≡σN G.
Proof. In case of semi-stable semantics the assertion follows by combining Theorems 1, 3, 5 and Proposition 3.
Let us turn to admissible, preferred and ideal semantics (σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}). Note that Theorems 1, 3 and Proposition 3
imply Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) ⇒ F ≡σNS G . This means, it suﬃces to show that F
k(ad) = Gk(ad) ⇒ F ≡σNS G . Almost all cases are
already proven in Theorem 5 (compare footnote 5 on p. 26). We will prove now the remaining case 2.2.4.
The case 2.2.4 is based on the following assumptions: A(Fk(ad)) = A(Gk(ad)) and R(Fk(ad)) = R(Gk(ad)). Hence, there are
two arguments a,b ∈ A(F), s.t. (a,b) ∈ R(Fk(ad)) \ R(Gk(ad)). Furthermore, we assume a = b and b is self-defeating, i.e.
(a,a) /∈ R(F) and (b,b) ∈ R(F). Using the following AF J we will prove that the AFs F and G are not normal expansion
equivalent w.r.t. admissible, preferred and ideal semantics. Let c be a fresh argument and B = A(F) \ {a,b}, then
J = (A(F) ∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ B}∪ {(b, c)}).
The following ﬁgure illustrates F ∪J and G ∪J . Note that (b,a) may or not be in R(F) or R(G) (indicated by dashed
arrows). Furthermore, (a,b) /∈ R(G) since (a,a) /∈ R(G) and (a,b) /∈ R(Gk(ad)) was assumed. For reasons of clarity we left out
possible attacks between the arguments in B and {a,b}.
Whether (b,a) is in R(F) or not we obtain Epr(F ∪J ) = {{a, c}}. If (b,a) ∈ R(G) we observe that apart from the empty
set no other set is admissible in G ∪J . Hence, Epr(G ∪J ) = {∅}. Consider now (b,a) /∈ R(G). The preferred extension of
G ∪J depends on whether a defends itself in G (and so in G ∪J ) or not. If so, we have Epr(G ∪J ) = {{a}}. If not, we get
Epr(G ∪J ) = {∅}. In all cases the preferred extension of G ∪J is unique and differs from {a, c}. Thus, the same holds for
ideal and admissible semantics (Propositions 1, 2). Hence, F ≡σN G for σ ∈ {ad, pr, id} concluding the proof. 
5.3. Normal expansion equivalence for grounded semantics
Strong equivalence w.r.t. the very cautious grounded semantics can be captured by the gr-kernel which “identiﬁes”
attacks (a,b) as redundant if both a and b are self-attacking or there is an attack (b,a) and b is self-defeating (Theorem 1).
The latter condition is a unique feature of the grounded semantics and reﬂects its subset-minimality among the complete
extensions. The following theorem shows that the gr-kernel is even suitable to characterize normal expansion equivalence
w.r.t. grounded semantics. For convenience, we repeat the deﬁnition of the gr-kernel of an AF F = (A, R), namely Fk(gr) =
(A, R \ {(a,b) | a = b, (b,b) ∈ R, {(a,a), (b,a) ∩ R = ∅}}).
Theorem 11. For any AFs F and G ,
Fk(gr) = Gk(gr) ⇔ F ≡grN G.
Proof. The if-direction, namely Fk(gr) = Gk(gr) ⇒ F ≡grN G is a consequence of Theorem 2 and Proposition 3. Hence, it
suﬃces to show the only-if-direction, i.e. F ≡grN G ⇒Fk(gr) = Gk(gr) . We will prove the contrapositive.
Suppose Fk(gr) = Gk(gr) . We skip the consideration of different arguments, i.e. 1st case: A(Fk(gr)) = A(Gk(gr)) as well
as the occurrence of different self-loops, i.e. case 2.1: (a,b) ∈ R(Fk(gr)) \ R(Gk(gr)) where a = b holds since the proofs of
them are exactly the same as in Theorem 7. In the following we assume A(Fk(gr)) = A(Gk(gr)) and any self-loop is either
contained in both R(Fk(gr)) and R(Gk(gr)) or none of them.
Case 2.2: Consider (a,b) ∈ R(Fk(gr)) \ R(Gk(gr)) with a = b. Note that (a,b) ∈ R(F) is implied. Consequently, at least
one of the following two statements has to hold: (b,b) /∈ R(F); (a,a) /∈ R(F) and (b,a) /∈ R(F). We will use the standard
construction I to prove some cases (c is a fresh argument).
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Case 2.2.1: Let (b,b) /∈ R(F). Consequently, (b,b) /∈ R(G) and hence, (a,b) /∈ R(G) since (a,b) /∈ R(Gk(gr)) holds. The
following extensions can be obtained by applying splitting results. If (b,a) ∈ R(F) or (a,a) ∈ R(F), then Egr(F ∪ I) =
{{c}} holds. If not, we get Egr(F ∪ I) = {{a, c}}. On the other hand, if (b,a) ∈ R(G) or (a,a) ∈ R(G) holds, we obtain
Egr(G ∪ I) = {{b, c}}. If not, we conclude Egr(G ∪ I) = {{a,b, c}}. This means, for all possible combinations Egr(F ∪ I) =
Egr(G ∪ I) follows. Case 2.2.2: Let (b,b) ∈ R(F) and furthermore, (a,a) /∈ R(F) and (b,a) /∈ R(F). Note that the attacks in F
w.r.t. the arguments a and b are uniquely determined. The union of F and I yields {a, c} as the unique grounded extension.
The AF G may occur in three conﬁgurations (remember that (a,a) /∈ R(G) and (b,b) ∈ R(G) is already assumed), namely
(i) (a,b), (b,a) ∈ R(G), (ii) (a,b) /∈ R(G), (b,a) ∈ R(G) and (iii) (a,b), (b,a) /∈ R(G). In the ﬁrst two cases Egr(G ∪H) = {{c}}
is implied. The third possibility establishes the grounded extension {a, c} too. Hence, we have to ﬁnd another AF K, s.t.
Egr(F ∪K) = Egr(G ∪K) is implied. Let c and d be fresh arguments and B = A(F) \ {a,b}. We deﬁne
K= (A(F) ∪ {c,d},{(b,d)}∪ {(c, c′) ∣∣ c′ ∈ B}).
The following ﬁgure illustrates F ∪K and G ∪K. We left out possible attacks between the arguments in B and {a,b}
since they can be “ignored” in case of evaluating the AFs w.r.t. grounded semantics.
The grounded extensions of F ∪K and G ∪K differ, namely {{a, c,d}} = Egr(F ∪K) = Egr(G ∪K) = {{a, c}}. This can be
seen as follows: The argument c is unattacked in F ∪K and G ∪K. Furthermore, in both AFs a is defended by {c} and
hence, {a, c} has to be a subset of the grounded extension in both AFs. We observe that d has to belong to the grounded
extension of F ∪K since it is defended by {a, c}. This does not apply to G ∪K. Consequently, F ≡grN G concluding the
proof. 
5.4. Normal expansion equivalence for complete semantics
Finally, we turn to complete semantics. Similarly to the other semantics considered in this paper we will show that a
different semantical behavior of two AFs w.r.t. arbitrary expansions and complete semantics is suﬃcient for not being normal
expansion equivalent w.r.t. complete semantics. This claim is illustrated in Example 12 from the beginning of this section
and will be a consequence of the following theorem showing that the co-kernel adequately describes normal expansion
equivalence w.r.t. complete semantics. Remember that the co-kernel of an AF F = (A, R) does not possess an attack (a,b) ∈
R if and only if both a and b are self-attacking.
Theorem 12. For any AFs F and G ,
Fk(co) = Gk(co) ⇔ F ≡coN G.
Proof. The if-direction, namely Fk(co) = Gk(co) ⇒ F ≡coN G can be obtained by combining Theorem 1 and Proposition 3,
item 1. Hence, it suﬃces to show that F ≡coN G ⇒ Fk(co) = Gk(co) holds. By Theorem 2 the latter implication is equivalent
to F ≡coN G ⇒ Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) and Fk(gr) = Gk(gr) . Using Theorems 10, 11 we may replace the kernel-equalities by normal
expansion equivalence w.r.t. preferred or complete semantics. Thus, we obtain the implication we have to prove, F ≡coN G ⇒
F ≡prN G and F ≡
gr
N G . If F ≡
pr
N G (or F ≡
gr
N G), then there exists an AF H with the property F N F ∪H and G N
G ∪H, s.t. F ∪H ≡pr G ∪H (or F ∪H ≡gr G ∪H). Hence, in both cases F ∪H ≡co G ∪H by applying the contrapositive
of Proposition 2, item 2. Consequently, F ≡coN G is shown concluding the proof. 
6. Summary of results and further conclusions
6.1. Overview: “Strength” of kernels
In this subsection we want to provide a quick overview of the considered kernels as well as their potential w.r.t. char-
acterizing equivalence relations. In the following we recall the resulting attack-relation of the σ -kernel or σ -*-kernel of an
AF F = (A, R). Remember that the considered kernels do not change the initial set of arguments, i.e. Fk(σ ) = (A, Rk(σ )) or
Fk∗(σ ) = (A, Rk∗(σ )), respectively.
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2. Rk(ad) = R \ {(a,b) | a = b, (a,a) ∈ R, {(b,a), (b,b)} ∩ R = ∅},
3. Rk
∗(ad) = R \ {(a,b) | a = b, ((a,a) ∈ R ∧ {(b,a), (b,b)} ∩ R = ∅)
∨ ((b,b) ∈ R ∧ ∀c ((b, c) ∈ R → {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c), (c,b)} ∩ R = ∅))},
4. Rk(gr) = R \ {(a,b) | a = b, (b,b) ∈ R, {(a,a), (b,a)} ∩ R = ∅},
5. Rk
∗(gr) = R \ {(a,b) | a = b, ((b,b) ∈ R ∧ {(a,a), (b,a)} ∩ R = ∅)
∨ ((b,b) ∈ R ∧ ∀c ((b, c) ∈ R → {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R = ∅))},
6. Rk(co) = R \ {(a,b) | a = b, (a,a), (b,b) ∈ R},
7. Rk
∗(co) = R \ {(a,b) | a = b, ((a,a), (b,b) ∈ R)
∨ ((b,b) ∈ R ∧ (b,a) /∈ R ∧ ∀c ((b, c) ∈ R → {(a, c), (c,a), (c, c)} ∩ R = ∅))}.
The following table (Fig. 2) provides a comprehensive overview of the potential of the above mentioned kernels. For
the sake of completeness we also mentioned local expansion equivalence (second line) since Oikarinen and Woltran have
shown that the ad-kernel even characterizes local expansion equivalence w.r.t. semi-stable, admissible, preferred and ideal
semantics (Theorem 8 in [7]). The entry “[7], n” in the table indicates two facts: First, the characterization problem is already
solved in [7] (Theorem n) and second, none of the considered kernels serve as a characterization.
Fig. 2. “Strength” of kernels.
6.2. The role of self-loop-free AFs
If we take a closer look at the deﬁnitions of the σ -kernel or σ -*-kernel of an AF F we observe that in case of self-loop-
free AFs nothing changes, i.e. F and its corresponding kernel are identical. Consequently, any equivalence relation on the
set of AFs characterizable through equality of kernels presented in this paper collapses to identity if we restrict ourselves
to self-loop-free AFs. This is stated in the following proposition for the equivalence relation studied in this paper, namely
normal and strong expansion equivalence.
Proposition 4. For any self-loop-free AFs F , G , any σ ∈ {st, ss,ad, pr, id, gr, co} and any Φ ∈ {N ,NS }:
F = G iff F ≡σΦ G.
This means, self-loop-free AFs are redundancy-free or in other words, all attacks may play a crucial role w.r.t. further
evaluations provided that the expansions are normal or strong. In the introductory part of this paper we noted that such
kinds of expansions naturally occur if Dung-style AFs are (re-)instantiated by a deductive argumentation system where
a new piece of information was added to the knowledge base. We want to mention that there are some formalisms like
classical logic-based frameworks where self-attacking arguments do not occur (cf. Theorem 4.13 in [4]). Other argumentation
systems like ASPIC [28] or a very simple formalism presented by Caminada in [29] “allow” self-defeating arguments. In the
latter systems arguments are deﬁned by applying two kinds of inference rules, namely strict and defeasible rules. We refer
the reader to Section 7 in [28] or Section 3 in [29] for examples of self-defeating arguments.
As an aside, the result stated in Proposition 4 cannot be conveyed to local and weak expansion equivalence w.r.t. any con-
sidered semantics. This means, there are syntactically different and self-loop-free AFs which are local expansion equivalent
(cf. Example 16 in [7]) or weak expansion equivalent (cf. Example 4 in [12]).
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Fig. 4. Relations for semi-stable semantics.
6.3. Relations between different notions of equivalence
In Section 3.4 (Proposition 3, Fig. 1) we considered preliminary relations between several notions of equivalence which
hold for any semantics. Using the characterization theorems proved in [7,12] as well as the established results of this paper
we may provide a more ﬁne-grained picture for the considered semantics.
We will present the results in one single theorem. For a better understanding we provide arrowed diagrams just like in
Fig. 1. The obtained relations hardly need a proof since they are simply combinations of former theorems. For this reason
we only list the involved statements instead of providing full proofs.
Theorem 13. For any AFs F and G ,
1. F ≡st G ⇔F ≡stN G ⇔F ≡stNS G ⇒F ≡
st
L G ⇒F ≡stNW G ⇒F ≡
st G ,
2. F ≡ss G ⇔F ≡ssN G ⇔F ≡ssNS G ⇔F ≡
ss
L G ⇒F ≡stNW G ⇒F ≡
st G ,
3. F ≡ad G ⇔F ≡adN G ⇔F ≡adL G ⇒F ≡adNS G,F ≡
ad
NW
G ⇒F ≡ad G ,
4. F ≡pr G ⇔F ≡prN G ⇔F ≡
pr
L G ⇒F ≡
pr
NS
G,F ≡prNW G ⇒F ≡
pr G ,
5. F ≡id G ⇔F ≡idN G ⇔F ≡idL G ⇒F ≡idNS G,F ≡
id
NW
G ⇒F ≡id G ,





G,F ≡grNW G ⇒F ≡
gr G ,
7. F ≡co G ⇔F ≡coN G ⇒F ≡coL G,F ≡coNS G,F ≡
co
NW
G ⇒F ≡co G .
Proof. We only list the involved statements.
ad 1.) Combine Proposition 3, Theorems 1, 4, 9, Theorem 9 in [7] and Proposition 3 in [12].
ad 2.) Combine Proposition 3, Theorems 1, 3, 5, 10 and Theorem 8 in [7].
ad 3.–5.) Combine Proposition 3, Theorems 1, 3, 6, 10 and Theorem 8 in [7].
ad 6.) Combine Proposition 3, Theorems 1, 3, 7, 11.
ad 7.) Combine Proposition 3, Theorems 1, 3, 8, 12. 
In our point of view, the most remarkable relations are those of stable and semi-stable semantics (Figs. 3 and 4) since
their corresponding equivalence relations are totally ordered w.r.t. subset-relation. Bearing in mind that strong, weak and
local expansions are completely different concepts the containedness or coincidence of their corresponding equivalence re-
lations is unexpected. We would like to point out that there are as yet no characterization theorems for weak expansion
equivalence w.r.t. admissible, preferred, ideal, grounded and complete semantics. This means, Figs. 5 and 6 are not neces-
sarily ﬁnal pictures.
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Fig. 6. Relations for grounded and complete semantics.
Baroni and Giacomin [30] introduced several general criteria for comparing and evaluating semantics. This paper was an
important step to classify semantics because until its publication comparisons between semantics were almost exclusively
example driven. The ﬁgures above motivate further criteria to compare argumentation semantics on an abstract level, for
example, coincidence, containedness or incomparability (w.r.t. subset-relation) of equivalence relations. The study of such
equivalence-based criteria as well as their relations to the criteria proposed in [30] will be part of future work.
7. Discussion and related work
In this paper, we studied two new equivalence relations for AFs, namely strong and normal expansion equivalence
which lie in-between standard equivalence and the recently proposed strong equivalence [7]. We provided characterization
theorems for a representative set of admissible-based semantics, namely stable, semi-stable, admissible, preferred, ideal,
complete and grounded semantics. In particular, we showed that for any considered semantics, normal expansion equiva-
lence coincides with strong equivalence. It is part of future work to verify whether this observation conveys to semantics
based on conﬂict-free sets like stage and CF2 semantics [31,32]. Furthermore, we showed that strong expansion equivalence
is strictly coarser than normal expansion equivalence in case of admissible, preferred, ideal, complete and grounded seman-
tics, while stable as well as semi-stable semantics do not “distinguish” between strong and normal expansion equivalence.
The obtained characterization theorems are based on syntactical criteria. To determine whether two AFs are normal or
strong expansion equivalent w.r.t. a certain semantics σ it suﬃces to compare certain kernels of them. A kernel of an AF F is
itself an AF obtained from F by deleting certain attacks depending on the considered semantics σ . It has been shown that,
if two AFs possess identical kernels under a certain semantics σ then they are inter-substitutable w.r.t. further evaluations
in dynamic scenarios satisfying the concept of normal or strong expansions, respectively. Such replacement properties are
essential for logical approaches in general, particularly for non-monotonic logics where this question becomes a non-trivial
task. In fact, beside the additional theoretical insights into how Dung’s non-monotonic formalism works, the results may
be used to reﬁne existing algorithms to compute extensions. A good example for simplifying AFs or reducing complexity
in terms of number of attacks is Example 8 on page 32. Although the AF F possesses much more attacks than AF G they
are strong expansion (and thus also standard) equivalent w.r.t. admissible, preferred and ideal semantics. It should be noted
that during such a simpliﬁcation process no arguments can be deleted. Furthermore, in case of self-loop-free AFs normal
and strong expansion equivalences collapse to identity, i.e. every attack may play a crucial role w.r.t. further evaluations.
In contrast to other non-monotonic formalisms where a huge number of equivalence notions in-between standard and
strong equivalence were studied, e.g. query equivalence [33] and uniform equivalence [34] in case of logic programs, we are
not aware of further studies apart from [7,14] devoted to abstract argumentation. In [35] different notions of equivalence
w.r.t. stable semantics of two logic-based argumentation systems are studied. More precisely, they studied the question
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nition, produce the same output w.r.t. stable semantics. Our results as well as the characterization theorems in [7,14] are
in some sense useless for their aim. The reason is that the authors concentrated on classical logic-based argumentation
systems where self-attacking arguments provably do not occur (cf. Theorem 4.13 in [4]). As mentioned in Section 6.2 other
formalisms like ASPIC [28] “allow” self-defeating arguments. Consequently, identifying redundant attacks may simplify the
evaluation of such systems.
Another mentionable work dealing with various notions of equivalence with regard to deductive argumentation is [36].
Due to the use of a very basic deﬁnition of an argument the presented complexity results holds for a whole range of
argumentation systems. They showed, for instance, that checking equivalence of argument sets is not computationally harder
than checking equivalence of arguments. Both are co-NP-complete.
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